



**CYBERSECURITY
& INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY AGENCY**



Mass Gathering Security Planning Tool

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) defines a mass gathering as a large number of people coming together in a particular location for a specific purpose. These locations, especially those associated with large crowds, could be an attractive target for terrorism and other crimes. Event planners may avoid or mitigate many such incidents by connecting with local authorities, developing plans to identify issues and support incident response, training staff and volunteers, and reporting concerns to emergency authorities.

The Mass Gathering Security Planning Tool is designed to provide event planners a framework to begin or continue planning efforts for a mass gathering or special event. The tool contains a combination of background information, event-planning checklist items, and venue characteristics, as well as suggested planning considerations based on the information entered. The output is not meant to identify every detail for consideration in mass gathering plans, but rather to identify an overarching framework for developing sound plans. The resources contained in this tool will point planners to credible resources to find best practices related to mass gatherings and event planning.

The output of the tool is a Microsoft Word report that outlines existing features at the venue and can inform ongoing collaboration among planning team members, law enforcement personnel, and first responders. The output will further provide some direction for improving the planning process.

Mass Gathering Information

Every event or mass gathering has properties that affect planning considerations. Hazards and threats are often the first variable planners consider when planning for a mass gathering or event. However, some of the most important considerations are the characteristics of the venue, the type of event, the number and demographics of people who will attend, and the ability of crowds to move safely throughout the venue. The information tab of this tool will help to establish those initial planning considerations.

Resources:

- ANSI, *ES1.9-2020 Crowd Management*: <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/>
- Event Safety Alliance, *The Event Safety Guide*: <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/the-event-safety-guide>
- CISA, *Mass Gatherings: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places*: <https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Mass%20Gatherings%20-%20Security%20Awareness%20for%20ST-CP.PDF>

- CISA, "Securing Public Gatherings": <https://www.cisa.gov/securing-public-gatherings>
- FEMA, *Special Events Contingency Planning*:
https://emilms.fema.gov/is_0015b/media/261.pdf

General Information and Points of Contact

Event or gathering name:

Event organizer or sponsoring agency/company/organization:

Event description:

Event dates:

Is this a recurring event?

☐ Yes

☐ No

If yes,

☐ Weekly

☐ Monthly

☐ Annually

☐ Other

Description:

Primary point of contact for event:

Name:

Position/title:

Agency/company/organization:

Phone:

Email:

Cell phone:

Secondary point of contact for event:

Name:

Position/title:

Agency/company/organization:

Phone:

Email:

Cell phone:

Point of contact for event security:

(if different from primary/secondary point of contact for event)

Name:

Position/title:

Agency/company/organization:

Phone:

Email:

Cell phone:

Primary law enforcement point of contact for event:

- ☐ Same as primary or secondary point of contact
- ☐ Same as event security point of contact
- ☐ 9-1-1

Name:

Position/title:

Agency/company/organization:

Phone:

Email:

Cell phone:

Primary point of contact for fire/rescue/emergency medical services for event:

- ☐ Same as primary or secondary point of contact
- ☐ Same as event security point of contact
- ☐ 9-1-1

Name:

Position/title:

Agency/company/organization:

Phone:

Email:

Cell phone:

Primary point of contact for emergency management for event:

- ☐ Same as primary or secondary point of contact
- ☐ Same as event security point of contact

Name:

Position/title:

Agency/company/organization:

Phone:

Email:

Cell phone:

Primary point of contact for public health:

- ☐ Same as primary or secondary point of contact
- ☐ Same as event security point of contact

Name:

Position/title:

Agency/company/organization:

Phone:

Email:

Cell phone:

Event-specific information

Venue type

The venue type can present challenges for security and emergency planning. If the mass gathering is slated to occur inside a building, has the building been designed to host this type of event safely? Are life-safety systems in place? Do temporary measures need to be added to offset the lack of life-safety systems? Have outdoor venues made concessions for environmental issues such as severe weather? Is the venue close to roads or high-traffic areas where vehicles may run into crowds? Is the surrounding area residential or urban? How will the mass gathering affect the local population located nearby? Will participants arrive early to tailgate or celebrate afterwards?

- ☐ Stadium with open roof
- ☐ Stadium with closed or closeable roof
- ☐ Arena
- ☐ Building (other than arena or stadium; event occurs entirely indoors)
- ☐ Pavilion (e.g., bandstand, band shell)
- ☐ Amusement park/water park
- ☐ Open-air stationary location (could include pop-up tents, food truck vendors)
- ☐ Open-air moving location (e.g., parade, marathon, biking/running event)
- ☐ Open-air fair/carnival (could include carnival rides and temporary, permanent, and semi-permanent facilities)
- ☐ Open-air vehicle or animal racetrack
- ☐ Mixed-use location (could include open-air mass gathering with building or arena)

Event population (number of people)

The total number of people expected at an event can be difficult to identify with specificity in advance. However, determining the time when maximum attendance will be present at the event is important for emergency and first-responder planning, especially at longer and multiple-day events where first responders may not be always present.

	Employees (paid employees of the sponsoring organization)	Volunteers (unpaid volunteers assisting with the event in some capacity)	Vendors (individuals selling goods, services, or information)	Spectators and participants (persons watching, presenting, participating in the event)
Number of people on most populated day or time of event				
Number of people on least populated day or time of event				
Number of people during off-hours (multi-day event, or preparation, set up, cleanup)				

Event population (crowd composition)

The composition of the anticipated crowd at an event can inform the type of security, support services, and planning needed. For example, crowd dynamics for sporting events that serve alcohol will be different than those at a non-sporting event where alcohol is not served. For more information about these selections, see the FEMA *Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual* p. 2-11: https://emilms.fema.gov/is_0015b/media/261.pdf

Who will be attending the event?

- ☐ Mostly children and adolescents
- ☐ Mostly families and/or mixed ages
- ☐ Adults other than concert or sporting (e.g., religious events, auctions, fund raisers)
- ☐ Adults at concert or sporting event
- ☐ Other

Event population (crowd density)

Planning considerations for crowd density include how to manage crowd traffic, how to disperse people from areas that have exceeded their capacity and determine the assets and personnel needed to respond to an incident such as a medical emergency. For more information about these selections, see the FEMA *Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, p. 2-11: https://emilms.fema.gov/is_0015b/media/261.pdf

What is the expected crowd density?

For more information about these selections, see the FEMA *Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, p. 1-9: https://emilms.fema.gov/is_0015b/media/261.pdf

- ☐ Fewer than 5 square feet per person (pretty close together and in personal space, shoulder to shoulder)
- ☐ Between 6-8 square feet per person (average adult with outstretched arms might touch another person)
- ☐ Greater than 8 square feet per person (average adult with outstretched arms will not touch another person)

Event type

Planners should tailor physical security, and security management measures to the venue. These determinations are shaped by the nature of the venue and location (e.g., urban vs. rural, surrounding terrain, transportation systems). Some venues are indoors and will require life-safety systems and static security posts. Other venues may be outdoors and more fluid, which will require planners to keep areas clear for emergency response vehicles coupled with more of a roving security presence.

Note: for the “Demonstration/controversial event (planned)” selection, see the “High-Profile/Controversial Events” section in the FEMA *Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, p. 2-9: https://emilms.fema.gov/is_0015b/media/261.pdf.

- ☐ Sports no animals (football, baseball, soccer, racing, etc.)
- ☐ Sports with animals (horse race, rodeo, dog show, etc.)
- ☐ Music concert
- ☐ Play
- ☐ Festival
- ☐ Parade
- ☐ Demonstration/controversial event (planned)
- ☐ Other

Will alcohol consumption be permitted?

Serving alcohol at events can add a dimension to crowd dynamics that requires further planning. Alcohol intoxication can lead to unsafe behavior that event planners should account for as a possibility during any event where alcohol is served. If alcohol is not allowed at the event, screening personnel should know what is prohibited, and develop a procedure to deal with patrons who try to enter with alcohol.

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

If yes:

Has the alcohol policy been coordinated with first responders?

Volunteers, employees, and first responders should understand the alcohol policy for the event.

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Can patrons bring alcohol into the event?

Allowing attendees to bring alcohol into an event can limit the effectiveness of alcohol sales policies at the venue. If outside alcohol is not allowed at the event, screening personnel should know what is prohibited, and develop a procedure to deal with patrons to try to enter with alcohol.

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Can the event cease alcohol sales during the event?

Ceasing alcohol sales prior to the official end of an event can prevent over intoxication. However, allowing attendees to leave and re-enter an event may limit the effectiveness of decisions to cease alcohol sales at specific times. For more information, see *The Event Safety Guide*, section 9.6.9, p. 109: <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/the-event-safety-guide>

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Will any very-important-persons (VIPs), senior officials, or dignitaries attend the event?

VIPs, senior officials, and dignitaries may add security requirements to the planning process. They may travel with their own security detail and may require certain types of protections systems. Event planners should ensure that security personnel are aware of the VIP presence and consider any special resources that might be needed to enhance security for these individuals.

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

If yes, (select all that apply)

- ☐ City, county, or local level (mayor or well-known local persons)
- ☐ State level (legislators, governor)
- ☐ National level or international
- ☐ Other celebrity or well-known persons

Crowd management plan

Crowd management entails understanding how a crowd is likely to behave and move during an event. Event planners should consider how patrons might move from event attractions to restroom areas, concessions, guest services, etc. Planners should anticipate these patterns and attempt to organize the venue based on expected crowd behavior.

The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) released a standard for crowd management with the Entertainment Services and Technology Association (ESTA) and the Event Safety Alliance (ESA). The standard outlines a model for crowd management known as DIME-ICE, which includes four elements (“Design, Information, Management, Expectations”) that are applied to three phases of a given event: Ingress, Circulation, and Egress.

The model uses a planning matrix that considers how each of the four elements affects those three phases. For more detailed information about the DIME-ICE model, see ANSI ES1.9-2020 Crowd Management available at <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/> under the “Crowd Management Standard” link in the Guidance section. The crowd management standard also highlights the RAMP (“Routes, Areas, Movement, and Profile”) analysis adapted from crowd science studies. This method covers the routes that people will take to move around the venue; areas to expand and/or restrict to determine safe crowd density; ways to anticipate crowd movement and interaction with venue

attractions; and how to profile crowd demographics to identify when and how a crowds might arrive and depart the event.

Select the most representative crowd management procedures

- The venue has no procedures or system in place to manage the ingress, circulation, or egress of crowds expected at the venue. Planners may have some general ideas of managing pedestrian traffic, but no overall system for crowd management exists. No systems are in place to communicate information and alerts.
- The venue has basic procedures to deal with crowd ingress, circulation, and egress. Planners have considered basic details such as crowd traffic patterns, placement of toilet facilities, and movement to and from concessions, but no comprehensive system exists to manage crowd behavior. The venue may have a person or department that can monitor crowds, but no one is fully dedicated to this task. Signs are used in some critical areas, but places exist where expected crowd paths could be better marked. The venue may have some ability to communicate information and alerts to the crowd.
- The venue has procedures to manage crowd movement during ingress, circulation, and egress. The procedures are written, and a crowd manager is assigned to monitor crowd movements and adjust crowd movement as needed. Signs are posted to direct crowd movements. The venue has a communications plan as well as a means of mass notification to communicate information and alerts to the crowd.

Planning considerations

- Develop procedures to manage crowd behavior. Consider using the DIME-ICE model to map expected crowd behavior, and develop a system to manage crowd movement during the three crowd phases (ingress, circulation, and egress). Anticipate areas where crowd paths may become bottlenecked or where converging paths cross (e.g., paths to and from concessions, bathrooms, information booths). Take steps to remove bottlenecks and avoid crossing paths. Use signs to highlight paths to common areas. Assign a manager to monitor crowd movements during the event and adjust pathways if possible.

References: American National Standards Institute, *ES1.9-2020: Crowd Management*. July 6, 2020. Accessed March 8, 2022. <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/>

University of Leeds, *Understanding Crowd Behaviours: Guidance and Lessons Identified*. 2009. P. 23. Accessed March 9, 2022. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62637/guideforreaders1_0.pdf

- Consider using the DIME-ICE model to characterize expected crowd behavior, and develop procedures to manage crowd movement during the three crowd phases (ingress, circulation, and egress). Anticipate areas where crowd paths may become bottlenecked or where converging paths cross (e.g., paths to and from concessions, restrooms, information booths). Take steps to remove or widen areas with bottlenecks and avoid crossing paths. Use signs to highlight paths to common areas. Develop a communications plan for a crowd manager to communicate with personnel who can adjust crowd pathways during the event as needed.

References: American National Standards Institute, *ES1.9-2020: Crowd Management*. July 6, 2020. Accessed March 8, 2022. <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/>

University of Leeds, *Understanding Crowd Behaviours: Guidance and Lessons Identified*. 2009. P. 23. Accessed March 9, 2022.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62637/guideforreaders1_0.pdf

- If not already used, consider using the DIME-ICE model to map expected crowd behavior, and develop a system to manage crowd movement during three crowd phases (ingress, circulation, and egress). Continue to monitor and improve crowd management through each event, and create a lessons-learned program to improve crowd management plans for subsequent events at the venue if applicable.

References: American National Standards Institute, *ES1.9-2020: Crowd Management*. July 6, 2020. Accessed March 8, 2022. <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/>

University of Leeds, *Understanding Crowd Behaviours: Guidance and Lessons Identified*. 2009. P. 23. Accessed March 9, 2022.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62637/guideforreaders1_0.pdf

Critical Areas

Planners should identify and describe critical areas that may need additional security during the event. Examples include main stage areas, backstage areas, beer gardens, and similar crowded areas; grandstands, ticket or entrance areas where people gather; critical points along a parade or race route for media or spectators; areas around race starting and finish lines; areas along a route that cross railroad tracks; areas along a route that are near hazardous-material storage areas; and areas located near utility connections that are critical for the event (e.g., electric, water, communications).

Critical Area	Description	Location (inner, middle, or outer perimeter)	Comments

Note: Planning considerations for critical areas include the following:

- Is this a place where people gather?
- Are procedures in place to manage pedestrian traffic?
- Are procedures in place to separate vehicle traffic from pedestrian traffic?
- If an evacuation or shelter-in-place plan exists, does it cover this area?
- What additional security measures (security officers or law enforcement, fences, controlled area) are in place for this area?
- Does the venue own or control the asset? If not, is the owner known?

Security Management Practices

Landing Page Text:

Security and emergency action plans are an essential part of planning for special events. Most facilities create security plans that focus on normal operating conditions. However, holding an event or a mass gathering likely represents a dynamic environment outside of normal operating conditions and that may require some tailored approaches to security and emergency management. Whether the venue has one overall plan with sections or annexes, or the plan is split into separate plans is less important than the existence and process of creating the plans. For templates and instruction on security, and emergency planning, see the following:

- FEMA, “Emergency Response Plan”: <https://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/emergency>
- FEMA, *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101: Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans*: <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/plan#cpg>
- CISA, *Facility Security Plan: An Interagency Security Committee Guide*: <https://www.cisa.gov/publication/isc-facility-security-plan-guide>
- FEMA, *Special Events Contingency Planning*: https://emilms.fema.gov/is_0015b/media/261.pdf
- U.S. Department of Justice, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*: <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>

For training:

- FEMA, “IS-15.B: Special Events Contingency Planning for Public Safety Agencies”: <https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=is-15.b>

General Security Practices

What type of command structure has been established?

For more information and training concerning National Incident Management System and incident command structure, see <https://training.fema.gov/nims/>.

- ☐ Unified command
- ☐ Incident command
- ☐ None

How is command structure established?

- ☐ Written charter
- ☐ Memorandum of understanding or memorandum of agreement (MOU/MOA)
- ☐ Incident action plan
- ☐ Verbal consensus/handshake
- ☐ None

The command structure includes the following (select all that apply):

- ☐ Event organizer
- ☐ Event operations
- ☐ Event logistics
- ☐ Event plans
- ☐ Event safety
- ☐ Event public information
- ☐ Event security
- ☐ Law enforcement
- ☐ Fire-rescue
- ☐ Emergency medical services
- ☐ Local/state emergency management
- ☐ Other

Is a command post established where decision makers can gather and have a central coordination area?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Security and Emergency Plans

Does the event or gathering have a written security or emergency operations plan(s)?

- ☐ The mass gathering does not have a written security and/or emergency operations plan(s). All security and emergency response procedures are communicated verbally and may be performed on an ad hoc basis.
- ☐ The mass gathering has some written documentation that partially addresses safety and emergency operations policies, programs, and/or procedures (e.g., a checklist), but a comprehensive plan(s) does not exist.
- ☐ The mass gathering has a comprehensive security and emergency operations plan(s) that addresses all common security plan topics. Leadership has approved the plan(s) and has coordinated the plan(s) with first responders, emergency management officials, and other community partners.

Planning considerations:

- ☐ Develop a comprehensive security and emergency action plan for the event/venue. The plan should address issues such as the following: protection of attendees; screening and access control procedures; suspicious activity reporting procedures; parking; prohibited items; security force; electronic security systems (including video-surveillance system [VSS]). The plan should also include procedures for threat scenarios including severe weather events and acts of targeted violence that include evacuation plans. The emergency action plan should assign responsibilities for carrying out specific actions to protect people (including those with disabilities and chronic medical needs who may need assistive devices such as wheelchairs and walkers), property, operations, and the environment in an emergency, as well as to provide incident stabilization.

References: National Fire Protection Association, 2019, *Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (NFPA 1600)*. 2019. Section 6, p. 1600-11.

Accessed March 9, 2022. <https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=1600>.

U.S. Department of Justice. *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guide for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. Page 7. Accessed March 9, 2022. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>.

- Review and expand the existing plan into a comprehensive security and emergency operations plan for the event/venue. The plan should address issues such as the following: protection of event attendees; screening and access control procedures; suspicious-activity reporting procedures; parking; prohibited items; security force; electronic security systems (including VSS). The plan should include procedures for threat scenarios including severe weather events and for acts of targeted violence that include evacuation plans. The plan should also include roles and responsibilities for all security and emergency duties.

References: Garcia, Mary Lynn, *The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems* (Burlington, MA: Elsevier Inc., 2008), 2nd edition.

U.S. Department of Justice. *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guide for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. P. 7. Accessed March 9, 2022. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>.

- Written plans can help ensure that security operations are coordinated effectively. Ensure that the security and emergency operations plans are communicated to the appropriate personnel. Ensure everyone understands their role and how to complete their portion of the plan.

Reference: FEMA, *Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101*. September 2021. P. 10. Accessed March 8, 2022. <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/plan#cpg>.

Are employees and or volunteers trained on the security and emergency operations plan(s)?

(Skip this question if the event does not have written security and emergency operations plans.)

- The event sponsor provides some information or training to some employees and volunteers, but not to everyone involved with implementing the plan(s). No one has access to references or checklists to aid in the execution of their responsibilities.
- The event sponsor provides information or training to most people involved with implementing the plan(s). Although all parties have completed training on the plan, they may not have easy access to references that will prompt them to execute their responsibilities effectively (e.g., quick reference guides, badge-sized reference cards) when an incident occurs.
- The event sponsor provides comprehensive training to everyone involved with implementing the security or emergency plan. Checklists or quick reference guides are widely distributed and in use.

Planning Considerations:

- Develop a security awareness training program to educate all personnel on their security/emergency-related responsibilities. Include in the program topics such as the

following: procedures for reporting suspicious activity, security incident (e.g., bomb threat, active shooter) emergency response procedures, and access control. The emergency action plan should assign responsibilities for carrying out specific actions to protect people (including those with disabilities and chronic medical needs who may need assistive devices such as wheelchairs and walkers) property, operations, and the environment in an emergency, and to support incident stabilization.

References: ASIS International, *Protection of Assets: Physical Security* (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International 2021).

Ready.gov, "Training." May 26, 2021. Accessed March 9, 2022.
<http://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/training>.

- Train all employees and volunteer staff to do the following: identify their responsibilities under the security and emergency operations program; recognize connections between the security and emergency program's objectives and selected security and emergency measures; remain familiar with resources for carrying out security/emergency-related responsibilities; and be prepared for security and emergency incidents.

Reference: Ready.gov, "Training." May 26, 2021. Accessed March 9, 2022.
<http://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/training>.

- Conduct refresher training for all personnel on the security and emergency plans. Ensure that updates to the plan are properly communicated and distributed to responsible parties.

Reference: Ready.gov, "Training." May 26, 2021. Accessed March 9, 2022.
<http://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/training>.

Has any type of exercise been conducted to test the security and emergency plans?

(Skip this question if the event does not have written security and emergency operations plans.)

- The event sponsor uses historical information from previous events as a basis for exercises. No specific training occurs on security or emergency plans to identify flaws or gaps in the process.
- The event sponsor conducts a tabletop exercise of the security and emergency plan. This may include first responders.
- The event sponsor conducts a functional or full-scale exercise of the security and emergency plan that includes first responders. All events are practiced and discussed.

Planning Considerations:

- Exercise the plan regularly with employees and other appropriate personnel to ensure that adequate resources are available to implement the plan and that all operating units can perform their responsibilities as defined in the plan.

Reference: ASIS International, *Protection of Assets: Physical Security* (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International 2021).

- Evaluate the security/emergency plan through annual exercises. Ensure exercises are designed to accomplish the following: 1) Identify planning and procedural deficiencies; 2) Test or validate recently changed procedures or plans; 3) Clarify roles and responsibilities; 4) Obtain participant feedback and recommendations for program improvement; 5) Measure improvement compared to performance objectives; 6) Improve coordination between internal and external teams, organizations, and entities; 7) Validate training and education; 8) Increase awareness and understanding of hazards and the potential impacts of hazards on the facility; and 9) Identify additional resources and assess the capabilities of existing resources, including personnel and equipment needed for effective response. Document the results of exercises conducted to test security and emergency plans. Implement procedures for capturing and implementing lessons learned.

Reference: National Fire Protection Association, *Standard Continuity, Emergency, and Crisis Management (NFPA 1600)*. 2019. Ch. 9, p. 1600-12. Accessed March 9, 2022.
<https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=1600>.

- Document the results of security plan and emergency plan exercises. Implement procedures for capturing and implementing lessons learned.

Reference: Ready.gov, "Training." May 26, 2021. Accessed March 9, 2022.
<http://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/training>.

Policies and Procedures

What systems are in place to support mass notification at the event?

For more information about mass notification/public address strategies, see section 4.2.2, "Emergency Announcements," in *ANSI ES1.9-2020 Crowd Management*:
<https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/>.

(select all that apply)

- ☐ None. No mass-notification system exists
- ☐ Public address (audio)
 - Public address cannot be heard in certain parts of the venue
 - Public address can be heard in all parts of the venue
 - A clearly defined process exists to use public address in loud areas (e.g., where music plays, races, or tractor pulls occur)
- ☐ Public messaging (display)
- ☐ Reverse 9-1-1
- ☐ Subscription text/email/social media

Will event planners conduct or receive a threat assessment prior to the event?

- Yes
- No

Potential threats and hazards that may impact the event: (select all that apply)

In addition to identifying the hazards that may impact the event consider creating a hazard decision matrix. This will determine how each area of the venue should respond when a specific weather or hazard condition is met so very little thought or direction is needed when responding to an incident. For more information about building a weather event matrix, see ANSI ES1.9 Crowd Management, p. 15: <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/> in the Guidance section under “Crowd Management Standard.”

- ☐ High winds, with or without thunderstorms
- ☐ Area flooding
- ☐ Extreme cold (for the vicinity)
- ☐ Extreme heat (for the vicinity)
- ☐ Tornado
- ☐ Thunderstorms (lightning, hail)
- ☐ Hazardous material release
- ☐ Active shooter attack
- ☐ Vehicle ramming attack
- ☐ Improvised explosive device (including vehicle, man-portable, or small unmanned aerial system)
- ☐ Civil disturbance
- ☐ Criminal activity

Does a protocol for assisting a lost child/lost person exist?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

If yes,

Has the policy been coordinated with first responders?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Does the event organizer or a designated representative monitor weather hazards in real time during the event?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Is natural hazard and threat monitoring and response coordinated with the local emergency management agency?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Does a policy regarding unmanned aerial systems exist?

For information about unmanned aerial systems threats, see the following:

CISA, *Protecting Against the Threat of Unmanned Aircraft Systems*: <https://www.cisa.gov/publication/protecting-against-threat-unmanned-aircraft-systems> and

CISA, *Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) – Critical Infrastructure*: <https://www.cisa.gov/uas-critical-infrastructure>.

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- If yes, does a policy for addressing violations exist?
 - ☐ Yes
 - ☐ No

Have event planners developed an evacuation and/or shelter-in-place plan?

For more information on evacuations and shelter-in-place, see the following:

FEMA, *Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Guidance for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Partners*: <https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/planning-considerations-evacuation-and-shelter-in-place.pdf>.

OSHA, “Evacuation Plans and Procedures eTool”: <https://www.osha.gov/etools/evacuation-plans-procedures/eap/>.

CISA, *Evacuation Planning Guide For Stadiums*: <https://www.cisa.gov/publication/evacuation-planning-guides>.

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- If yes;
 - Is the shelter big enough for everyone and safe enough for the most likely hazards?
 - ☐ Yes
 - ☐ No
 - Can the venue safely be evacuated before the onset of the most likely hazards, given the amount of warning expected?
 - ☐ Yes
 - ☐ No
 - Will evacuees be safe in evacuation locations after evacuating or once outside of the event sponsor’s jurisdiction?
 - ☐ Yes
 - ☐ No

Are the plans coordinated with first responders or emergency management?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Are the plans trained or exercised?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Identify the communications functions in place (select all that apply)

- ☐ The venue has a process in place to communicate regularly with all key partners supporting the event
- ☐ Radio communications is integrated between all agencies involved in the event
- ☐ The venue has adequate communications technology and equipment
- ☐ The venue has a communications backup plan
- ☐ Security operations center is co-located with law enforcement operations
- ☐ Real-time communications exist between the security operations center and law enforcement operations

Who conducts security and safety inspections?

- ☐ No process is in place to conduct security and safety inspections of the venue.
- ☐ Event staff or volunteers inspect the venue using a checklist.
- ☐ Event staff or volunteers, along with first responders, inspect the venue using a checklist.

Planning Considerations:

- ☐ Develop a process to conduct inspections prior to the event. Create a checklist of items for both security and safety such as unlocked doors and windows, suspicious items, indicators of improvised explosive devices, vehicle inspections, fire hazards, obstacles in emergency evacuation routes. If possible, engage with law enforcement and the local fire marshal to conduct safety inspections. Determine whether security or safety inspections are required by local, county or state policies.

References: U.S. Department of Justice. *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. Accessed March 9, 2022.

<https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>

CISA, Office for Bombing Prevention “Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Training and Awareness.” 2022. <https://www.cisa.gov/bombing-prevention-training>. Accessed March 28, 2022.

- ☐ Review the checklist and ensure that relevant security and safety topics are included. Share the checklist with law enforcement and emergency response personnel. Determine whether security or safety inspections are required by state and local policies.

Reference: Event Safety Alliance of USA, Inc., *The Event Safety Guide*. November 21, 2013. P. 10. Accessed March 8, 2022. <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/the-event-safety-guide>.

- If not already done, document and track deficiencies found during the inspections. Use this information to update checklists and inspection procedures especially if the event is recurring or if the venue frequently hosts other events.

Reference: Event Safety Alliance of USA, Inc., *The Event Safety Guide*. November 21, 2013. P. 20. Accessed March 8, 2022. <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/the-event-safety-guide>.

Does a process exist to inspect the venue for suspicious items prior to the event?

- No process is in place to inspect any part of the venue for suspicious items.
- Event staff or volunteers use a process to inspect the venue for suspicious items.
- Event staff or volunteers have a process to inspect the venue for suspicious items, along with first responders using K-9 units.

Planning Considerations:

- Develop a process to identify, report, and respond to suspicious items. Train personnel on suspicious-activity reporting procedures as well as procedures for handling suspicious items. Develop a response plan for when a suspicious item is identified, and ensure all personnel understand their role during such an event.

References: CISA, "Counter-IED Awareness Products." Undated. Accessed March 30, 2022. <https://www.cisa.gov/counter-ied-awareness-products>.

CISA, "Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Training and Awareness." 2022. <https://www.cisa.gov/bombing-prevention-training>. Accessed March 28, 2022.

- Coordinate procedures for the identification of suspicious items with first responders. Consider the use of bomb-detecting K-9 units prior to event(s).

References: CISA, "Counter-IED Awareness Products." Undated. Accessed March 30, 2022. <https://www.cisa.gov/counter-ied-awareness-products>.

CISA, Office for Bombing Prevention "Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Training and Awareness." 2022. <https://www.cisa.gov/bombing-prevention-training>. Accessed March 28, 2022.

- Distribute indicators for suspicious items to all inspection staff.

References: CISA, "Counter-IED Awareness Products." Undated. Accessed March 30, 2022. <https://www.cisa.gov/counter-ied-awareness-products>.

CISA, "Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Training and Awareness." 2022. <https://www.cisa.gov/bombing-prevention-training>. Accessed March 28, 2022.

In each box, estimate the number of security and law enforcement personnel who will be onsite.*

	Employees performing security	Volunteers performing security	Contract security	Local law enforcement	Mutual aid and additional law enforcement
Most populated day or time					
Least populated day or time					
Onsite after hours					
Armed	<input type="radio"/> All <input type="radio"/> Some <input type="radio"/> None	<input type="radio"/> All <input type="radio"/> Some <input type="radio"/> None	<input type="radio"/> All <input type="radio"/> Some <input type="radio"/> None	<input type="radio"/> All <input type="radio"/> Some <input type="radio"/> None	<input type="radio"/> All <input type="radio"/> Some <input type="radio"/> None

* Event planners should consider the expected crowd composition. Audiences for rock concerts, large sporting events, and demonstrations that may be more active might need more security and law enforcement personnel. This may also apply to events where alcohol is being served.

Are off-duty officers permitted to retain firearms?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

Does the event have a procedure to identify undercover and off-duty officers to avoid friendly fire incidents?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

Are employees, volunteers, vendors, spectators, and participants permitted to carry firearms?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

What is the longest response time anticipated for first responders to arrive at any location at the event?

	Armed law enforcement	Fire/rescue	Emergency medical services
Response time in minutes			

Physical Security

Landing Page Text:

Physical security measures are necessary for mass-gathering events to protect the crowd from internal and external threats. Not all physical measures will be appropriate for all venues. Some events are one-time occurrences. For these types of events, the crowd size and composition, as well as the location and characteristics of the venue, will determine how organizers prioritize and implement physical security measures. For permanent or recurring events, planners should consider more permanent features and implement a cycle of continuous improvements over time.

Resources: U.S. Department of Justice, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guide for Law Enforcement*: <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>

Event Safety Alliance, *The Event Safety Guide*: <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/the-event-safety-guide>

Perimeter security

When implementing perimeter security for an event, planners should think about security measures in layers. Since most mass gatherings involve a large area where people can congregate, establishing a strong perimeter in an area security model is important. Most physical security measures and screening efforts focus on the perimeter to ensure that patrons screened and/or vetted prior to entry. From there, security personnel can apply additional controls to restrict patron access to critical assets. If a perimeter cannot be established, a point security approach may be more feasible. This alternative would involve a loosely controlled perimeter, where security personnel can visually screen people entering the event and concentrate security measures as needed on specific points to protect assets, VIPs, and attractions.

How is the perimeter of the event defined?

- The perimeter of the venue is undefined or loosely defined by natural or geographic boundaries or a temporary, easily defeated fence or rope. This perimeter may be defined by streets, tree lines, buildings, roads, rope, plastic construction fence, snow fence, or similar material.
- The perimeter of the venue is defined primarily with temporary measures that may include a variety of blockades, temporary fences, Jersey barriers, and other materials.
- The perimeter of the venue is clearly defined by permanent or semi-permanent fence and fixtures. This may include a combination of chain-link fence, Jersey barriers, and other materials.

Planning Considerations

- Define the perimeter around the venue. Barriers and security fencing that delay and deter access are preferred. If not available, even temporary fencing materials (e.g., construction or snow fence), ropes, and other materials can help to define the perimeter. Identify areas where access control measure should be established, define and separate vehicle traffic from pedestrian traffic. Post signs that communicate authorized and unauthorized access to further identify the perimeter. Use security or other personnel stationed around the perimeter to prevent unauthorized entry.

References: CISA, *Mass Gatherings: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places*. Undated. Accessed March 8, 2022.

<https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Mass%20Gatherings%20-%20Security%20Awareness%20for%20ST-CP.PDF>

U.S. Department of Justice, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. P. 33-37. Accessed March 9, 2022.

<https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>

- Consider the use of more permanent materials like chain-link fences, vehicle barriers, and large rocks or planters, especially at permanent venues or those with reoccurring events. Identify ways to reduce vehicle speeds using serpentines, barriers and other traffic calming measures. If possible, choose a venue with natural perimeter materials such as berms, hedges, or rock faces, or with ample land to provide a natural standoff distance from neighboring facilities or urban/suburban activities. Post signs that communicate authorized and unauthorized access to further identify the perimeter. During the event, use security or other personnel stationed around the perimeter to prevent unauthorized entry.

Reference: U.S. Department of Justice. *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. P. 33-37. Accessed March 9, 2022.

<https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>

- Post signs that communicate authorized and unauthorized access to further identify the perimeter. Use security or other personnel stationed around the perimeter to prevent unauthorized entry. Consider the use of permanent or portable lighting to illuminate the perimeter and areas just beyond it that might enable concealment for nefarious activity.

Reference: ASIS International, *Protection of Assets: Physical Security* (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International 2021), P. 204.

Do security planners use multiple layers of protection to enhance perimeter security at the event?
(Skip this question if the event does not have an established perimeter.)

- The venue has made no attempt to incorporate layers into perimeter security.
- The venue has made some attempt to incorporate layers in the perimeter security plan. It may have an inner layer that is differentiated from the outer perimeter, but areas still exist where the inner perimeter is not fully established. Some security measures have been established for the inner layer.
- The venue has three distinct layers of perimeter security: outer, middle, and inner. Separate security measures for each of the layers have been established and the layers are clearly marked.

Planning Considerations

- Use a layered approach to establish an outer, middle, and inner layer even at indoor venues. The outer perimeter should be used to prevent forced entry by vehicles using barriers and other devices as well as pedestrian traffic control. The middle perimeter should be the first level of access control for persons and their possessions; establish access control and

screening procedures at this layer. The inner layer includes areas for performers and VIPs or special areas like backstage; strict screening procedures and identification should be used at this layer. Ensure evacuation routes through the perimeter system are identified.

Reference: U.S. Department of Justice, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. Page 33-37. Accessed March 9, 2022. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>

- Use a layered approach to establish an outer, middle, and inner layer even at indoor venues. The outer perimeter should be used to prevent forced entry by vehicles using barriers and other devices as well as pedestrian traffic control. The middle perimeter should be the first level of access control for persons and their possessions; establish access control and screening procedures at this layer. The inner layer includes areas for performers and VIPs or special areas like backstage; strict screening procedures and identification should be used at this layer. Ensure evacuation routes through the perimeter system are identified.

Reference: U.S. Department of Justice, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. P. 33-37. Accessed March 9, 2022. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>

- Ensure all personnel understand the layers and their purpose. Use a color-coded credentialing or badge system to identify authorized uses of the inner perimeter. Empower personnel to challenge individuals who are not authorized to use special purpose areas. Ensure evacuation routes through the perimeter system are identified.

Reference: U.S. Department of Justice, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. P. 33-37. Accessed March 9, 2022. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>

Vehicle traffic control

Select the most representative description of traffic control measures planned for the event:

- Event planners may have outlined a general approach for traffic control and parking, but it has not been coordinated with law enforcement or traffic control agencies. No maps have been created that show anticipated routes for spectators. No fire lanes or routes for emergency vehicles exist.
- Event planners have developed some parking and traffic control measures. These measures have been coordinated with law enforcement or other traffic control agencies. However, no maps have been created that show anticipated routes for spectators. Fire lanes or routes for emergency vehicles are defined.
- Event planners have developed detailed traffic flow and parking measures and have maps available. These measures are coordinated with law enforcement or other traffic-control agencies. Event organizers have direct communication with traffic-control teams. Fire lanes or routes for emergency vehicles are defined and enforced.

Planning Considerations

- Develop traffic control and parking measures for the event. These measures should consider the general traffic flow, location of parking areas and identify routes of ingress and egress into the area. Identify pedestrian routes to and from the parking areas and plan to separate pedestrian and vehicle traffic where possible. Designate vehicle routes and fire lanes for emergency vehicles. Use portable signs to identify traffic routes and no parking areas. Coordinate these measures with law enforcement if applicable/possible.

Reference: Event Safety Alliance of USA, Inc., *The Event Safety Guide*. November 21, 2013. P. 10. Accessed March 8, 2022. <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/the-event-safety-guide>.

- Create and distribute maps with traffic flow patterns and establish communications between traffic control personnel and event organizers. Use portable signs to identify traffic routes and no-parking areas. Evaluate the impact of event traffic on local/residential traffic patterns and identify mechanisms to communicate those changes with local residents.

Reference: Event Safety Alliance of USA, Inc., *The Event Safety Guide*. November 21, 2013. P. 10. Accessed March 8, 2022. <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/the-event-safety-guide>.

- Adjust traffic-control activities during different phases of the event such as closing some areas to vehicle traffic during crowd ingress and egress times. Consider the impact of vehicle traffic on the local area and communicate with local residents about potential changes to local traffic patterns.

Reference: Event Safety Alliance of USA, Inc., *The Event Safety Guide*. November 21, 2013. P. 10. Accessed March 8, 2022. <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/the-event-safety-guide>.

High-speed avenue of approach

A high-speed avenue of approach is any road or flat area that would allow a vehicle to gain sufficient speed to enter or reach a critical area before the vehicle can be detected, deterred, or interdicted.

Does the venue have a high-speed avenue of approach?

- The venue has at least one unmitigated high-speed avenue of approach. The facility has made no efforts to attempt to mitigate any high-speed approaches.
- The venue has one or more high-speed avenue(s) of approach and has attempted to mitigate at least one of these vulnerabilities. The results of mitigation are mixed. Spacing may be too wide, and materials may not be strong enough to protect against all vehicles.
- The venue does not have a high-speed avenue of approach or has mitigated high-speed avenues of approach using effectively placed bollards, barriers, or natural materials. Mitigation may include multiple types and combinations of bollards, barriers, and natural materials that effectively mitigate all high-speed avenues of approach.

Planning Considerations

- Evaluate vehicle traffic patterns near the venue. Design and implement strategies to reduce vehicle speeds, improve pedestrian safety, and reduce the threat of vehicle approach velocities. Install barriers to mitigate high-speed avenues of approach, deny vehicle entry, and provide perimeter protection. Options include, but are not limited to, fixed and retractable bollards, engineered planters, heavy objects and trees, walls and ha-ha barriers, water obstacles, and Jersey barriers.

Reference: FEMA, *Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series – Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings*, (FEMA 426/BIPS-06). Section 2.3.4.4, p. 2-43 to 2-56. October 2011. Accessed March 10, 2022.
<https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/st-bips-06.pdf>.

- Evaluate vehicle traffic patterns near the venue. Design and implement strategies to reduce vehicle speeds, improve pedestrian safety, and reduce the threat of vehicle approach velocities. Install barriers to mitigate high-speed avenues of approach, deny vehicle entry, and provide perimeter protection. Options include, but are not limited to, fixed and retractable bollards, engineered planters, heavy objects and trees, walls and ha-ha barriers, water obstacles, and Jersey barriers. Consider using CISA's Vehicle Ramming Self-Assessment resources to evaluate the need for protecting pedestrians from a vehicle-ramming attack at <https://www.cisa.gov/vehicle-ramming-attack-mitigation>.

Reference: FEMA, *Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series – Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings*, (FEMA 426/BIPS-06). Section 2.3.4.4, p. 2-43 to 2-56. October 2011. Accessed March 10, 2022.
<https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/st-bips-06.pdf>.

- Consider using CISA's Vehicle Ramming Self-Assessment resources to evaluate the need for protecting pedestrians from a vehicle-ramming attack at <https://www.cisa.gov/vehicle-ramming-attack-mitigation>.

Vehicle Screening Measures

Select the most representative vehicle screening process:

- No screening of vehicles occurs at any point or area of the venue. Vehicles can park without any search or screening.
- Untrained volunteers or employees perform cursory vehicle checks to deter spectators from bringing unauthorized items into the venue. Posters or signs list prohibited items.
- Trained security personnel, trained security officers or law enforcement personnel perform vehicle inspections. Employees or volunteers may assist. Posters or signs list prohibited items.

Planning Considerations

- Monitor all vehicles approaching an entrance or gathering of people for signs of threatening or suspicious behavior (e.g., unusually high speed, vehicles riding particularly low, vehicles emitting a chemical odor, occupants keeping the windows open even in cold or inclement weather).

Reference: CISA, *Mass Gatherings: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places*. Undated. Accessed March 8, 2022.

<https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Mass%20Gatherings%20-%20Security%20Awareness%20for%20ST-CP.PDF>.

- Evaluate the need to provide security staffing for vehicle access control points. Security force personnel may be trained and authorized to conduct vehicle searches and to deny vehicle access.

Reference: FEMA, *Risk Management Series – Site and Urban Design for Security* (FEMA 430). Section 2.5, p. 2-30, section 5.5, p. 5-8 to 5-15, section 6.5, p. 6-22 to 6-23.

December 2007. Accessed March 8, 2022. <https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema430.pdf>.

- Continue to evaluate screening procedures and disseminate new indicators suspicious activity when appropriate.

Entry Controls and Screening

Screening Procedures

Select the most representative screening process for spectators and attendees:

- No screening of personnel or bags takes place at any point or area of the venue. Patrons can bring anything into the venue area at any time without question.
- Untrained volunteers or employees perform cursory bag or cooler checks to deter spectators from bringing unauthorized items. Posters or signs list prohibited items.
- Trained security or law enforcement personnel may perform bag checks. Additional screening of spectators entering the venue may take place. Employees or volunteers may assist. Posters or signs list prohibited items.

Planning Considerations

- Develop procedures for screening persons and bags. Determine whether a visual or physical search is necessary. Identify prohibited items such as firearms and weapons, alcohol, glass bottles etc. Post signs that clearly state prohibited items. Be sure to include procedures for searching bags and coolers and policies for storing or discarding prohibited items. These may include a return to vehicle policy. Identify where screening will occur (e.g. before entering middle layer perimeter) and consider how and where to manage the line for screening.

Reference: CISA, *Public Venue Screening Guide: Commercial Facilities Sector*, June 2021, Accessed March 10, 2022, <https://www.cisa.gov/publication/public-venue-security-screening-guide>.

- Consider using trained security personnel for screening people and bags entering the venue. If trained security personnel cannot be used, train volunteer or other event staff on screening. Improve screening processes by increasing throughput and screening times. Assess waiting areas to ensure they are free from other hazards such as vehicle ramming attacks, falling objects, and other dangerous situations.

Reference: U.S. Department of Justice, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. P. 34-36. Accessed March 9, 2022. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>.

- Improve screening processes by increasing throughput and screening/search times. Assess waiting areas to ensure they are free from other hazards such as vehicle ramming attacks, falling objects or other dangerous situations. Post a prohibited items list to the public website for the website. Clearly identify items that can and cannot enter the venue. Coordinate entry times with screening personnel to ensure that screeners will have enough time to conduct the screening process.

Reference: U.S. Department of Justice, *Planning and managing Security for Major Special Events: Guide for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. P. 34-36. Accessed March 9, 2022. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>.

Entry control layers

Are layers of entry control established?

- No layers of entry control are established. Once people are screened and enter the venue, no controls exist to keep them from sensitive areas.
- Some layers of entry control are established. The venue has made some effort to control spectator flow and entry using ropes, plastic fences, or other easily defeated barriers. Some areas such as kitchens, vendor areas, and backstage areas may have slightly better controls that include locked doors, volunteer or contract security, or similar controls.
- Multiple layers of entry control are established to prevent spectators and others from entering sensitive areas. These controls may be badges, wrist bands, in-person security personnel, locked doors, semi-permanent barriers, or other similar security measures.

Planning Considerations

- Use a layered approach to entry control. Use an outer perimeter to prohibit vehicle traffic and post signs with security policies and prohibited items. Use the middle perimeter for basic screening procedures like taking tickets and person/bag searches. Establish an inner perimeter or identify sensitive areas (e.g., backstage, performer lounges, critical infrastructure) and use visitor lists, identification, and/or a badging system that clearly identifies authorized users.

Reference: U.S. Department of Justice, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. P. 33-37. Accessed March 9, 2022. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>.

- Continue to clearly establish multiple layers of entry control and post signs clearly marking authorized use. Use the outer perimeter to control and prohibit vehicle traffic. Establish an inner perimeter or identify sensitive areas (e.g. backstage, performer lounges, critical infrastructure) lock doors where possible and use visitor lists, identification, and/or a badging system that clearly identifies authorized users.

Reference: U.S. Department of Justice. *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. Page 33-37. Accessed March 9, 2022. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>.

- Continue to improve and define layers of entry control. For high-profile events or events where VIPs may be present, develop policies to identify and manage VIP bodyguards and how to handle their presence and weapons status.

Reference: U.S. Department of Justice. *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. Page 33-37. Accessed March 9, 2022. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>.

Security Systems

Illumination

Select the most representative description of illumination for the overall event location:

- The venue and surrounding area is not illuminated at all, or illumination appears to be uneven and dissimilar in type causing glare, dark areas, and shadows with inconsistent coverage in most areas.
- Illumination appears to be similar and consistent in type; however, light pattern coverage does not overlap, causing shadows or dark areas.
- Illumination appears to be similar and uniform in type with overlapping light pattern coverage in most areas.

Planning Considerations

- Install lighting for critical areas, fences, gates, and/or parking areas. Before installation, determine the appropriate type of lighting based on the overall requirements of the site and the building (e.g., continuous or standby). In addition, consider operational costs, such as life-cycle costs for energy and maintenance, when designing an appropriate lighting situation.

References: FEMA, *Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series – Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 426/BIPS-06)*. Section 2.4.3, p. 2-67 to 2-69. October 2011. Accessed March 10, 2022. <https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/st-bips-06.pdf>.

Garcia, Mary Lynn, *The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems* (Burlington, MA: Elsevier Inc., 2008), 2nd edition. P. 136-138.

- Update the lighting system to include overlapping cones of light to eliminate or reduce shadows and dark areas.

Reference: FEMA, *Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series – Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 426/BIPS-06)*. Section 2.4.3, p. 2-68. October 2011. Accessed March 10, 2022. <https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/st-bips-06.pdf>.

- If applicable, establish a maintenance protocol to ensure that system components are regularly inspected and repaired or replaced as necessary. Ensure that lighting fixtures are clean and properly aimed.

Reference: FEMA, *Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series – Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 426/BIPS-06)*. Section 2.4.3, p. 2-68. October 2011. Accessed March 10, 2022. <https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/st-bips-06.pdf>.

Video surveillance

Select the most representative description of video surveillance in place for the event:

- ☐ The venue has established no video surveillance. Some portions of the venue may have surveillance through private or community-owned cameras, but no designated video surveillance for the venue or event exists.
- ☐ Some video surveillance is available for some sensitive areas of the venue. Some temporary cameras may be installed. Some areas lack coverage. Some portions of the venue or route may have additional surveillance through private or community-owned cameras.
- ☐ Extensive video surveillance of the venue exists. Temporary camera towers are installed to aid in coverage of sensitive areas. Community-owned cameras are extensive and cover much of the venue in addition to facility-owned cameras.

Planning Considerations

- ☐ Evaluate the need to install video surveillance cameras in the following locations outdoors: along the perimeter, at controlled access points, within the protected area, and approaches to critical assets. If the venue has cameras that are not controlled by event staff, identify who is responsible for monitoring the system and exchange contact information.

Reference: FEMA, *Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series – Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 426/BIPS-06)*. Section 5.5.3.2, p. 5-46 to 5-47. October 2011. Accessed March 10, 2022. <https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/st-bips-06.pdf>.

- ☐ Increase coverage to monitor critical areas. If increasing camera coverage is not possible, consider adding elevated towers or platforms for security personnel to monitor these areas.

Reference: FEMA, *Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series – Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 426/BIPS-06)*. Section 5.5.3.2, p. 5-46. October 2011. Accessed March 10, 2022. <https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/st-bips-06.pdf>.

- ☐ Evaluate the camera system and facility requirements. Evaluate existing cameras for function, maintenance, and use. Install an updated system that captures critical areas and meets facility requirements. Explore the use of portable security cameras for use in unusual events or heightened security threats.

Reference: Garcia, Mary Lynn, *The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems* (Burlington, MA: Elsevier Inc., 2008), 2nd edition. P. 149-150.

Select the most representative description of video surveillance and recording measures in place for the event

(skip if there is no video surveillance)

- ☐ The venue has no people or organizations actively monitoring the surveillance cameras. Video is not recorded, or recordings are retained for less than one week.
- ☐ Some parts of the video surveillance system may be observed by an employee or volunteer, but that is not the person's primary responsibility. The camera system maintains recordings for about one week.
- ☐ Much of the camera surveillance system is monitored in real time by security staff. The system retains video for more than a week and up to one month.

Planning Considerations

- ☐ Evaluate the need for real-time monitoring of the VSS based on the security requirements of the facility.

Reference: Garcia, Mary Lynn, *The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems* (Burlington, MA: Elsevier Inc., 2008), 2nd edition.

- ☐ Evaluate the need for dedicated, trained security staff to monitor the VSS system. Explore options to maximize the effectiveness of VSS monitoring and observation, such as frequently rotating shifts for monitoring staff and limiting the number of cameras that each staff member monitors.

Reference: Baker, Paul R. and Daniel J. Benny, *The Complete Guide to Physical Security* (Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis Group, 2013). 2nd edition, p. 220-221.

- ☐ Develop written policies and procedures that address the operation and maintenance of the VSS system. Include camera-monitoring responsibilities, storage practices for recorded information, and appropriate response actions.

Reference: ASIS International, *Protection of Assets: Physical Security* (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International 2021), 372, p. 376-377.

Resources

Event Safety and Security

- Event Safety Alliance, *The Event Safety Guide*: <https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/the-event-safety-guide>
- U.S. Department of Justice, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*: <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf>
- CISA, “Security Public Gatherings”: <https://www.cisa.gov/securing-public-gatherings>

Security and Emergency Planning

- FEMA, *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101: Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans*: <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/plan#cpg>
- CISA, *Facility Security Plan: An Interagency Security Committee Guide*: <https://www.cisa.gov/publication/isc-facility-security-plan-guide>
- FEMA, *Special Events Contingency Planning*: https://emilms.fema.gov/is_0015b/media/261.pdf

Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place

- CISA, “Evacuation Planning Guide for Stadiums”: <https://www.cisa.gov/publication/evacuation-planning-guides>
- FEMA, *Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Guidance for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Partners*: <https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/planning-considerations-evacuation-and-shelter-in-place.pdf>
- OSHA, “Evacuation Plans and Procedures eTool”: <https://www.osha.gov/etools/evacuation-plans-procedures/eap/>

Physical Security and Security Systems

- CISA, “Vehicle Ramming Attack Mitigation”: <https://www.cisa.gov/vehicle-ramming-attack-mitigation>
- CISA, *Patron Screening Best Practices Guide*: <https://www.cisa.gov/publication/patron-screening-guide>
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