CISA Mitigation Instructions for CVE-2025-0282

(Updated March 28, 2025) CISA updated these mitigations based on identification of a new malware variant called RESURGE that could undermine the effectiveness of the mitigations previously provided. For more information on RESURGE, see MAR-25993211.R1.V1.CLEAR and CISA Releases Malware Analysis Report on RESURGE Malware Associated with Ivanti Connect Secure. 

This page contains the mitigation instructions that correspond to the CISA KEV catalog entry CVE-2025-0282 – Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and ZTA Gateways Stack-Based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability. 

For all instances of Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and ZTA Gateways: 

  1. Conduct threat hunting actions:  
    1. Run an external Integrity Checker Tool (ICT). For more guidance, see Ivanti’s instructions.  
    2. Conduct threat hunt actions on any systems connected to—or recently connected to—the affected Ivanti device.  
  2. If threat hunting actions determine no compromise:
    1. For the highest level of confidence, conduct a factory reset.
      1. For Cloud and Virtual systems, conduct a factory reset using an external known clean image of the device.
    2. Apply the patch described in Security Advisory Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure & ZTA Gateways (CVE-2025-0282, CVE-2025-0283).
    3. Monitor the authentication or identity management services that could be exposed.
    4. Continue to audit privilege level access accounts.
  3. If threat hunting actions determine compromise:
    1. Report to CISA and Ivanti immediately to start forensic investigation and incident response activities.  
    2. Disconnect instances of affected Ivanti Connect Secure products.  
    3. For the highest level of confidence, conduct a factory reset.
      1. For Cloud and Virtual systems, conduct a factory reset using an external known clean image of the device.
    4. Isolate the systems from any enterprise resources to the greatest degree possible.
    5. Revoke and reissue any connected or exposed certificates, keys, and passwords, to include the following:
      1. Reset the admin enable password.
      2. Reset stored application programming interface (API) keys.
      3. Reset the password of any local user defined on the gateway, including service accounts used for auth server configuration(s). 
    6. If domain accounts associated with the affected products have been compromised:
      1. Reset passwords twice for on premise accounts, revoke Kerberos tickets, and then revoke tokens for cloud accounts in hybrid deployments.
      2. For cloud joined/registered devices, disable devices in the cloud to revoke the device tokens.
    7. After fully investigating and conducting a factory reset any affected products, agencies may restore such systems to service.