Designate an individual as a security manager or a group of individuals as a security committee, and ensure that person or group is responsible for developing, implementing, and coordinating all security-related activities. If the manager or committee members have no security or law enforcement background, make sure they reach out to local law enforcement to become acquainted. Provide security management training and/or access to training materials and resources.

Schedule regular meetings to review security procedures and incidents.

Coordinate safety and security planning with other committees, departments, and groups.

Hire or appoint additional personnel to support the facility’s security mission.

Regularly assess the facility’s security management program. Conduct security surveys, risk assessments, and threat assessments of the facility and neighboring areas. Implement best practices based on collaborative relationships and new or updated resources.

Establish a collaborative planning team with representatives from the house of worship, as well as first responders and others who may have roles and responsibilities in security and emergency management before, during, and after an incident at the facility. Define roles and responsibilities, and determine a regular schedule of meetings for the planning process. Before developing the plan, identify, assess, and prioritize potential threats and hazards; and determine goals and objectives. Write, review, and approve the plan.

Review and expand the existing plan(s). Format the plan in a way that makes it easy for users to find the information they need and that is compatible with relevant local and state plans. Check the plan for compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

Update the plan(s) to address all of the areas listed above. If the security and emergency operations plans are combined, explore the option of separating security topics from emergency operations topics into two separate plans.

Present the plan(s) to the appropriate leadership and obtain official approval of the plan(s). Coordinate the plan(s) with first responders, emergency management officials, and other community partners. Continue efforts to develop separate plans for security and for emergency operations.

Regularly train, exercise, evaluate, review, and update the plan(s). Effective plans should be reviewed and updated annually based on exercise results, research, evolving threats, and lessons learned from real-world incidents.

Provide training to everyone involved in the plan(s) so they understand their roles and responsibilities before, during, and after an incident.

At least once a year, hold a meeting to educate all involved parties on the plan. Show involved parties where evacuation sites, reunification areas, media areas, and triage areas will be located. Provide training on the skills necessary for individuals to fulfill their roles. Persons will be assigned specific roles in the plan that will require special skills, such as first aid and the provision of personal assistance services for children, the elderly, individuals with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs.

Provide follow-up training to everyone involved in the plan(s) annually and throughout a calendar year. Provide appropriate and relevant literature on the plan(s), policies, and procedures (e.g., quick reference guides, badge-sized reference cards).

Provide regular refresher training throughout the year (e.g., once a quarter) to everyone involved in the plan(s).

Regularly assess the training program for the security and emergency plan(s) to identify and remedy any gaps or shortfalls.

Provide at least annual training on the security and emergency operations plan(s) for all congregants.

Evaluate the need to provide more frequent training to congregants. Evaluate the completeness of training and provide additional information as necessary. Train congregants on appropriate emergency response actions regardless of their location in the house of worship. Ensure congregants are trained to cooperate and not to interfere with first responders.

Regularly assess the training program to identify and remedy any gaps or shortfalls. Document the delivery of training.

Provide the security and emergency operations plan(s) to local law enforcement and other first responders as necessary.

Review the security and emergency operations plan(s) with first responders, and make changes as necessary. Share critical building and facilities information with first responders. Invite law enforcement, fire response, and emergency medical services personnel who have a role in the plan to tour the house of worship.

Offer the facility as a training and exercise location for law enforcement. Ask for assistance with traffic control if necessary. Consider hiring off-duty officers as part of the security program. Notify law enforcement of special events.

Create a crisis response kit that contains the information and equipment needed for effective management of a major critical incident. The kit may include the following information: (1) camera locations; (2) up-to-date floor plans; (3) list of key personnel and phone numbers (senior staff, facilities, security, etc.); (4) master key(s); (5) building/security force radio (if applicable); and (6) evacuation routes and assembly area locations. Due to the sensitive nature of the contents of the kit, take measures to safeguard it appropriately. Designate more than one individual to meet and assist first responders and provide them with the crisis response kit in the event of an incident.

Continue coordination with first responders. Coordinate with law enforcement to conduct security surveys, risk assessments, and threat assessments of the facility and neighboring areas. Review the contents of the crisis response kit quarterly to ensure it remains up to date. Coordinate with first responders regarding the contents of the kit. Test the radio(s) on a monthly basis, and keep batteries charged. Use the crisis kit during a drill.

Test the plan at least once annually through either a tabletop exercise or a drill. Tabletop exercises are small group discussions that walk through a scenario and the courses of action a facility will need to take before, during, and after an incident. During drills, personnel use the actual facility grounds and buildings to practice responding to a scenario.

Invite community partners to participate in exercises that test the plan(s).

Document the results of all exercises, areas for improvement, and lessons learned in after-action reports. Conduct a functional exercise where events are projected through a scenario with updates that drive activity. A functional exercise is conducted in a realistic, real-time environment; however, movement of personnel and equipment is usually simulated. One aspect of a functional exercise is that participants use their real-world communication. Sometimes for that reason these are referred to as command post exercisers.

Conduct simultaneous functional exercises to validate and evaluate multiple capabilities and functions.

After conducting multiple simultaneous functional exercises, explore the option of holding a full-scale exercise as a capstone that involves multiple agencies, organizations, jurisdictions, and even congregants. Full-scale exercises are the most complex and resource-intensive type of exercise. They often include many players operating under a cooperative system such as the Incident Command System.

Develop lockdown procedures to ensure all persons are secured quickly in rooms away from immediate danger during incidents that pose an immediate threat of violence in the house of worship. Develop lockout procedures to ensure all persons on the premises return to and are secured within the building when conditions outside the house of worship are unsafe. Develop shelter-in-place procedures for situations when persons are required to remain in the facility, perhaps for an extended period, because it is safer inside the building or a room than outside.

Review and expand existing lockdown, lockout, and shelter-in-place procedures. Ensure information concerning lockdown, lockout, and shelter-in-place procedures and locations is communicated to congregants, including individuals with disabilities or others with access and functional needs.

Post key information (e.g., lockout procedures, lockdown and shelter-in-place locations) throughout the facility to provide congregants with easy access to this information.

Regularly assess the facility’s lockdown, lockout, and shelter-in-place procedures, and update them as needed. Use after-action reports for each exercise of the security and emergency operations plan(s) to improve these procedures. Evaluate the need for and integration of “safe rooms” in order to provide immediate life-safety protection against extreme threats or hazards. A designated safe room may be equipped with a duress button, telephone, and reinforced doors.

Research, evaluate, and implement enhancements to lockdown, lockout, and shelter-in-place procedures based on collaborative relationships and new or updated resources.

With consideration of the size of the facility and the congregation, install a public address system to provide a means of mass communication and to provide warning and alert information, along with actions to take before and after an incident. Monitor external sources for important emergency information (e.g., weather alerts, public safety announcements from local first responders, and national public warnings from the Emergency Alert System).

Explore options to communicate warnings more effectively beyond only audible alerts, such as strobe lights. Test the emergency mass communication system periodically to ensure its functionality and so employees, volunteers, and congregants are familiar with its use.

Verify that employees, volunteers, and congregants know how to respond appropriately to alerts onsite. Ensure that notification protocols are readily available and understood by those who may be responsible for sending out or broadcasting an announcement.

Develop a plan for crisis communications. Include a list of emergency contacts such as law enforcement, religious leaders, relevant volunteers, security committee members, and others. Establish emergency communication protocols to clearly designate the chain of command as to who should be contacted in the event of an emergency or major incident. Coordinate communication procedures that include mass notification texts, social media posts, and emails.

Evaluate crisis communications plans and procedures for completeness. Include procedures for coordinating with local government, crisis communications, and external affairs officials (e.g., public information officers). Ensure plans address how affected congregants will be supported if they prefer not to engage with the media. This may include strategies for keeping the media separate from congregants while the emergency is ongoing and supporting congregants who may experience unwanted media attention at their homes. Designate a spokesperson for the congregation to gather the facts and issue statements. Provide the spokesperson with relevant training and/or resources. Stipulate that other congregants refrain from speaking to the media.

Regularly review crisis communications plans and procedures to identify and remedy any gaps or shortfalls. Use after-action reports from operations plan(s) exercises to improve these plans and procedures.

Monitor open-source intelligence information related to threats against houses of worship for criminal, cybercrime, and terrorist activities.

Request access to a vetted, private information-sharing network such as FB-ISAO. Contact the local police department regarding access to crime report information.

Establish a networking group with other religious leaders in the community to share best practices and intelligence information regarding safety and security. Reach out to the local Protective Security Advisor for assistance with coordinating this networking group.

Reach out to other religious leaders in the community, local law enforcement, and/or federal, state, or local homeland security or emergency management officials to identify opportunities to participate in security or emergency preparedness working groups.

Prioritize attendance at security or emergency preparedness working group meetings.

Seek out more ways for facility personnel to benefit from participating in the security or emergency preparedness working group, for example, by getting involving in special events or activities or by taking leadership positions in the group.

Join other security or emergency preparedness working groups to increase engagement and gain additional resources in these areas.

Assess the need to engage with additional security or emergency preparedness working groups.

After seeking legal counsel, procure background checks for employees and volunteers, especially for individuals working with children. Establish a standard waiting period when a new person arrives before allowing them to serve in various capacities, such as childcare. Keep personnel files on all staff and volunteers.

Procure background checks on all employees and volunteers.

Procure thorough background checks that include criminal history and prior employment. Require individuals who handle money to consent to a credit and background check. Run a license check on individuals who drive vehicles.

Procure recurring background checks for all employees and volunteers on a regular basis.

Audit personnel files regularly to verify background checks have been completed and recurring checks are completed as scheduled.

Provide information about specific security incidents to employees and volunteers.

Provide security awareness information in addition to information about specific security incidents.

Provide more detailed and comprehensive security awareness information. Disseminate information regularly.

Disseminate security information through a variety of formats (e.g., emails, posters, announcements, regular meetings). Explore ways to expand and increase messaging to congregants regarding steps they can individually take to strengthen the facility’s security culture.

Continue to provide security information to employees, volunteers, and congregants. Solicit feedback regarding the usefulness of the type of information provided.

Develop two checklists, one to help to help employees and volunteers to respond to a bomb threat and another to help personnel identify suspicious items left around or within the house or worship, or delivered to the facility. Establish procedures for regular delivery services and employees to ensure all mail and packages are delivered to a single location. Ensure external entities cannot deliver mail or packages directly to an individual.

Develop detailed guidelines for responding to a bomb threat and comprehensive procedures for suspicious items that define their common characteristics and outline appropriate response actions. Share these plans and procedures with employees and volunteers. Ensure congregants are aware that if they encounter a suspicious item, they should leave it alone and notify someone in authority.

Review the existing bomb threat and suspicious item procedures, and incorporate additional information as needed. Share the updated procedures with employees and volunteers.

Provide regular training on bomb threat and suspicious item procedures as appropriate.

Test bomb threat and suspicious item procedures. Review bomb threat and suspicious package procedures to identify and remedy any gaps or shortfalls. Based on the results of a risk assessment and if budgets allow, explore options for centralizing mail and package handling and processing operations at a location separate from the house of worship.

Establish written policies and procedures that identify administrative controls and requirements to provide resource and expenditure safety, security, and accountability. Provide secure storage of contributions and other collections.

Keep detailed and accurate financial records. Implement requirements for multiple persons to handle money. Basic internal controls dictate that (1) at least two people (preferably unrelated) should be present when counting money and another individual may observe the process; (2) at least two people (preferably unrelated) should be required to open a safe or vault; and (3) if the safe or vault is opened using a combination, the combination should be split into segments and given to two or more people.

Screen individuals with access to contributions and other collections with a thorough background check that includes a credit check.

Require individuals with cash access to sign a confidentiality agreement stating that they will not copy, photograph, remove and/or release any financial data.

Conduct regular and reconciliations, internal reviews, and audits. Submit financial reconciliations to leaders for review regularly (e.g., monthly). Periodically conduct an unscheduled count or reconciliation of petty cash.

Assign and provide training to a few paid or volunteer members to perform basic security tasks that include ensuring doors and windows are locked, coordinating active-shooter response procedures, and addressing suspicious activity.

Explore the feasibility of establishing or contracting a security force or forming and training a volunteer force at the facility to actively protect the congregation and the property, and to rapidly respond to security incidents and/or emergencies. Depending on state and local regulations, security force personnel may be subject to registration, licensing, certification, specific training, and other requirements.

Establish agreements or contracts to employ a security force with the specific purpose of facility security. Contact local law enforcement and coordinate onsite visits with an on-duty officer during regular gathering times.

Establish agreements or contracts to employ a security force with the specific purpose of being an onsite security force at all major gathering times. The security force is employed or contracted for the specific purpose of facility security. This may include an officer from the local police force that provides onsite presence during all regular gathering times.

Routinely review the role of the security force and establish metrics for continuous improvement and modification to the role. Ensure the security force is actively engaged with the house of worship leadership and assists with or conducts ongoing training and development of employees and volunteers as related to security.

Use the DHS Active Shooter Preparedness website to establish initial training. At a minimum, provide security awareness training at initial employment for all paid and volunteer members involved in security roles. Provide refresher yearly refresher training related to active shooter and other emergency response activities.

Use the DHS Active Shooter Preparedness website as needed to enhance training. In addition to initial employment and once per year, conduct follow-up training at least one other time throughout the year. Develop or contract a formal training program for those responsible for security such as emergency response Incident Command System/National Incident Management System. Provide continuation and in-service training for employees and volunteers to maintain and enhance job proficiency. Document training and retain training records.

Use the DHS Active Shooter Preparedness website as needed to enhance training. Employ security professionals certified or licensed through a federal or state program. Ensure the training requirements they fulfilled to become certified or licensed will equip them to fulfill the facility’s security requirements. Establish a security topic as part of regular meetings. Provide all employees and volunteers with awareness materials and training throughout the year. Train employees and volunteer to provide immediate bleeding control in an emergency. Provide bleeding control supplies.

Use the DHS Active Shooter Preparedness website as needed to enhance training. Use security force, or law enforcement (local, state, or federal) to conduct additional training and exercises throughout the year. Provide all paid and volunteer members awareness materials and update materials throughout the year.

Use the DHS Active Shooter Preparedness website (or equivalent) to enhance training. Enhance training with realistic drills and exercises. If possible, involve congregants in active-shooter drills or exercises to create a realistic simulation. Document lessons learned and implement updated actions.

Establish procedures for reporting unusual items and suspicious activity to include notification to law enforcement. Assign a security force, staff, or faculty member to conduct security-related inspections of the facility.

Establish a security checklist that incorporates roles and responsibilities and what areas to evaluate. Common areas of interest include under stages in main gathering areas, seating areas, offices, rooms or areas with tile ceilings, and similar areas that may have hazardous materials or places to easily conceal weapons or other contraband. Be alert for graffiti or suspicious packages. Notify law enforcement of any activity. Provide training for personnel conducting inspections.

Conduct daily inspection of sensitive areas especially before people gather. Ensure doors are not propped open, and windows, loading areas, and exterior doors are secured. Report suspicious activity, weapons, and drugs to the security force and law enforcement as needed.

Continue daily inspections. Ensure a security force presence in a random pattern throughout the facility, focusing on sensitive areas.

Provide training on identifying suspicious activity and search techniques. Augment existing security plans by including written inspection procedures. Provide trainings on that section of the plan, and conduct periodic drills and exercises to validate the plan.

Investigate the cost and use of panic alarms for key personnel or critical locations. Key personnel may include greeters and other personnel who may be the first to determine that an attack is occurring. Ensure the security team/force has basic radio equipment for communications.

Expand the use of panic alarms to include employees and volunteers and isolated or sensitive locations at the house of worship. This may include childcare areas, administrative offices, and common areas.

Ensure the security force/team has all equipment required to perform the functions of the job. This may include radios, restraints, non-lethal weapons, and possibly transportation. Ensure panic buttons or duress alarms are assigned to key personnel. Place panic buttons or duress alarms in isolated or hard-to-reach areas of the facility, such as childcare areas, administrative offices, and common areas.

Ensure the security force/team has all equipment required to perform necessary job functions. This equipment may include radios, restraints, non-lethal weapons, and possibly transportation. Ensure panic buttons or duress alarms are located throughout the facility, and provide portable alarms. Ensure remote or isolated areas of the house of worship, such as childcare areas, administrative offices, and common areas, also have alarms.

Establish and implement a policy to test, replace, and repair the equipment as needed.

Assign personnel to monitor for threat activities during periods when congregants are arriving and departing.

Provide training to monitoring personnel. Relevant topics may include intruder response, reverse evacuation, and how to assist in the arrival of public safety vehicles. Provide personnel with a radio to communicate with building/office staff or the security force/team, and ensure they have access to a phone for calling 9-1-1. Areas to be monitored should include sanctuary and building entrances, as well as parking areas.

Encourage continuity of monitoring personnel to facilitate positive rapport with congregants. In addition to serving a security purpose, monitors can help foster a sense of community and provide a welcoming presence while also contributing to security awareness.

Designate specific areas or posts and patrol areas for the security force/team. Write basic procedures and responsibilities of each area/post/patrol. Topics for these post orders should include description of post/area/patrol, contact information, procedures for access control, equipment control, emergency procedures, and other duties and procedures as necessary.

If not already written, write basic procedures and responsibilities of each area/post/patrol. Topics for these post orders should include description of post/area/patrol, contact information, procedures for access control, equipment control, emergency procedures, and other duties and procedures as necessary. Incorporate the post orders into the security plan that communicates not only specific procedures, but also a code of ethics, standards of conduct and security policies for the organization.

Continue to revise and adjust post locations, definitions and procedures as necessary. Ensure key stakeholders are aware of the security procedures, post orders and responsibilities of security force/team.

Provide some basic training in security awareness such as FEMA IS-906: Workplace Security Awareness training and the “Protect Your Every Day” public service announcement.

Provide some basic training in security awareness such as FEMA IS-906: Workplace Security Awareness training and the “Protect Your Every Day” public service announcement. Create and distribute a list of suspicious behavior, and ensure ushers, greeters, and volunteers know how to contact leadership or the security force to report suspicious behavior.

Create on ongoing training program for ushers, greeters, and volunteers to continue to communicate indicators of suspicious behavior, ongoing security concerns and other security incidents relevant to the community. Conduct some basic exercises to test the process.

Designate someone to respond to security concerns. This may be someone assigned security duties, a security manager, or the security force. Ensure all employees, volunteers, and congregants know who is designated to receive security concerns and how to contact that person or department. This may be part of an informal or formal process.

Provide a formal means of reporting non-immediate and immediate security concerns. For immediate concerns, the process may include distributing a radio to contact the security team or cell phone number of someone who can respond. Provide de-escalation training for those responders. For non-immediate security concerns, the facility may distribute and post a designated security phone number or email account that is checked regularly. Develop a program for handling at-risk individuals.

Continue to update and refine the process for reporting security concerns. If designated security responders change, ensure all personnel are aware of the change and update all written procedures to reflect the change. Consider expanding program for dealing with at-risk individuals to other volunteers or employees.

If fencing does not exist, determine what role, if any, fencing should have at the facility (e.g., to clearly distinguish the perimeter of the site to protect against trespassing, provide access control by channeling individuals through authorized access points, and/or protect against unauthorized entry by providing increased access delay and more time for assessment). Install fencing that is appropriate for the facility’s objectives. If fencing exists, repair or replace it as needed. If fencing is not a viable solution for the house of worship, employ CPTED principles and/or barriers (e.g., bollards, decorative flower pots, high curbs, shallow ditches) to provide enhanced penetration delay.

Install additional fencing to enclose the facility to the maximum extent possible and/or employ CPTED principles and/or barriers (e.g., bollards, decorative flower pots, high curbs, shallow ditches) to provide enhanced penetration delay. If fences are installed in places where people gather, ensure proper egress exists from the area in the case of an emergency.

Explore the feasibility of improving the landscape to supplement the existing facility perimeter fence. Landscaping examples include earthen berms, low-growing shrubs, plants, or trees. Regularly assess and maintain the fence. Explore the option of combining elevation changes and/or aggressive plantings with fencing barriers for additional protection. (Aggressive plantings include cacti, thorny bushes, and plants and trees.) If fences are installed in places where people gather, ensure proper egress exists from the area in the case of an emergency.

Use an inside-outward approach and view the property from the building outward. Identify overgrown vegetation, large objects such as statues and landscaping devices, and other objects that block the ability to identify people approaching the facility. Create a plan to reduce the amount of vegetation and objects that obstruct the view of critical areas and assets such as vehicle approaches, pedestrian avenues of approach, or public spaces. The plan may take a phased approach to reduce obstructions as time and budget permit.

Use an inside-outward approach and view the property from the building outward. Identify overgrown vegetation, large objects such as statues and landscaping devices and other objects that block the ability to identify people approaching the facility. Create a plan to reduce these obstructions. If some obstructions cannot be reduced or eliminated, consider using camera systems to enhance the ability to surveil those areas or rearrange the campus to support natural surveillance. These activities can include moving/reducing vehicle entrances to the property, moving/removing public access areas, and rerouting pedestrian traffic to avoid those areas and increase safety for congregants entering the property.

Continue to maintain the property to ensure good natural surveillance of the perimeter and critical areas. If some obstructions still exist, consider using landscaping features to impede movement of a potential intruder in those areas and reduce areas that can be used as hiding spots.

Observe and document traffic flows in the facility. Identify areas where congregants must pass through a controlled or restricted zone to reach a public or common space. Congregants who do not have special access to controlled zones should be able to enter the facility and use all public and common spaces without crossing into controlled or restricted zones. If possible, reroute traffic or ensure controlled or restricted zones are locked. Use signage to identify areas where congregants should not go.

Identify areas where public/controlled zones are mixed. Make plans to enhance the ability to lock controlled and restricted areas (e.g., install locks, move file cabinets or expensive equipment). Use signage to identify areas where congregants should not be. Consider moving or removing doorways where it is difficult or impossible to restrict public access to a controlled or sensitive area. Post security personnel or volunteers in areas where access cannot be completely controlled.

Continue to observe traffic flow in the facility and ensure all employees, volunteers, and security force personnel are aware of the proper access controls in restricted areas. Enforce policies to keep restricted access areas closed and locked during appropriate times.

If improvements to the fence are not possible, employ CPTED principles.

Evaluate all aspects of the fence to identify deficiencies in coverage, and install enhancements to improve its effectiveness and penetration delay such as anchoring the base of the fence.

Ensure the fencing is in good repair to maintain deterrence value. Explore the option of supplementing with other deterrence measures such as security cameras.

Assess the need to install gates to provide appropriate levels of access control and/or penetration delay against individuals.

Install gates at identified pedestrian/vehicle gaps along the perimeter. Ensure that all gates have at least equivalent properties to the rest of the fence.

Ensure gates remain in good repair. Explore the option of providing security camera coverage for all gates.

Install lighting on the perimeter. Ensure the lighting is even and overlapping to avoid shadows, dark areas and glare. Ensure lighting is compatible with existing or planned closed-circuit video (CCV) systems.

Develop a plan to improve lighting on the perimeter. Improvements can include increasing the type and number of luminaires and/or upgrading to more modern bulb types such as LED.

Continue to maintain the lighting system on the perimeter. Develop a plan to identify and replace burned-out bulbs and clean lenses according to manufacturer specifications and timelines.

Establish a list of prohibited items, including potential weapons, if one does not already exist. Visually observe vehicles entering the property, and look for prohibited items.

Provide full camera coverage and adequate lighting for videotaping activity in the parking lots, and/or conduct periodic patrols around the parking area and visually screen for potentially dangerous items. Post signage identifying that parking areas are monitored.

Keep the camera system in good repair to ensure continuous coverage of parking areas.

Develop policies to address extended-stay vehicles. Install signs in the parking area to deter this practice.

Coordinate policies that involve external reporting; for example, review the policy with local law enforcement or set up a contract with a towing company. Install signs in the parking area to deter this practice.

Continue patrols and inspections. Maintain training for suspicious activity and search techniques. If not already done, install signs in the parking area to deter this practice.

Review the access points to parking areas. Reduce the number of vehicle access points if possible. Limit access through the use of curbs, fencing, gates, and a minimum number of entry points.

Explore ways to employ security personnel to monitor most parking areas. Identify areas that allow vehicle placement within 30-50 feet of the facility, and evaluate options to reduce the facility’s exposure to nearby vehicle placement.

Confirm the effectiveness of vehicle monitoring, and remedy any gaps or shortfalls. Continue efforts to provide a minimum of 50 feet of standoff distance from buildings.

Evaluate parking lots, and determine if long straight lines facilitate speeding. Consider whether parking lots could be reconfigured to reduce vulnerabilities. Install speed bumps to slow traffic.

Conduct a barrier survey to evaluate effectiveness. Remedy large gaps between barriers, and replace barriers made of weak or ineffective materials.

Conduct a barrier survey to evaluate effectiveness. Remedy large gaps between barriers, and replace barriers made of weak or ineffective materials. Ensure the most critical high-speed avenue of approach is mitigated.

Prioritize unmitigated high-speed avenues of approach, and begin efforts to mitigate these vulnerabilities, beginning with the most critical.

Maintain barriers, especially those made of natural materials. When construction or modification activities take place onsite, assess and address any new potential high-speed avenues of approach.

Allow only employee and volunteer parking near the building, and restrict visitor or general public parking to 20-50 or more feet away. Restrict parking between individual buildings. At small standoff distances, even a few feet make a large difference.

Explore ways to increase the standoff distance from the house of worship building. Refer to Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series Incremental Protection for Existing Commercial Buildings from Terrorist Attack (FEMA-459) for more information.

Provide camera coverage any areas where vehicles may be place (e.g., drop-off and pick-up areas, loading and unloading zones, parking lots). Ensure the house of worship has adequate lighting capable of displaying and videotaping lot activity.

Install lighting on the parking areas. Ensure the lighting is even and overlapping to avoid shadows, dark areas and glare. Ensure lighting is compatible with existing or planned CCV systems.

Develop a plan to improve lighting in parking areas. Improvements can include increasing the type and number of luminaires and/or upgrading to more modern bulb types such as LED. Ensure pathways from entrances to parking areas are well-illuminated.

Continue to maintain the lighting system in parking areas. Develop a plan to identify and replace burned-out bulbs and clean lenses according to manufacturer specifications and timelines.

Limit or prohibit bags, packages, and backpacks in administrative areas or fellowship halls unless accompanied by known persons or escorts. Train ushers and administrative personnel on unusual activity and unusual packages. If possible, post signs banning weapons. Train personnel to not accept unscheduled deliveries or packages from unknown delivery services. Establish, publish, post, and distribute procedures for items brought to fellowship halls, administrative areas, and sanctuaries. This may include not allowing packages or items dropped off or unattended without notification or someone of authority in attendance. Evaluate the feasibility of magnetometer screening throughout the facility or on primary worship service days. Establish a holding area for deliveries.

Limit or prohibit bags, packages, and backpacks in administrative areas or fellowship halls unless accompanied by known persons or escorts. Train administrative personnel on unusual activity and unusual packages. If possible, post signs banning weapons. Train personnel to not accept unscheduled deliveries or packages from unknown delivery services. Establish, publish, post, and distribute procedures for items brought to fellowship halls, administrative areas, and sanctuaries. This may include not allowing packages or items dropped off or unattended without notification or someone of authority in attendance. Evaluate the feasibility of magnetometer screening throughout the facility or on primary worship service days. Establish a holding area for deliveries.

Limit or prohibit bags, packages, and backpacks in administrative areas or meeting halls unless accompanied by known persons or escorts. Train personnel to not accept unscheduled deliveries or packages from unknown delivery services. Establish, publish, post, and distribute procedures for items brought to fellowship halls, administrative areas, and sanctuaries. This may include not allowing packages or items dropped off or unattended without notification or someone of authority in attendance. Evaluate the feasibility of magnetometer screening throughout the facility or on primary worship service days. Establish a holding area for deliveries.

Limit or prohibit bags, packages, and backpacks in administrative areas or meeting halls unless accompanied by known persons or escorts. Establish, publish, post, and distribute procedures for items brought to halls, administrative areas, and sanctuaries. This may include not allowing packages or items dropped off or unattended without notification or someone of authority in attendance. Evaluate the feasibility of magnetometer screening throughout the facility. Establish a holding area for deliveries.

Limit or prohibit bags, packages, and backpacks in administrative areas or unless accompanied by known persons or escorts. Establish, publish, post, and distribute procedures for items brought to fellowship halls, administrative areas, and sanctuaries.

Lock the doors and windows to the house of worship when not occupied. The doors may be unlocked for a period of time before and after primary worship services, but they are attended during services so that ushers will recognize anyone entering the building after the start time. Lock administrative areas when not occupied and also when only one or two people are onsite. Always lock a cash room even when occupied and implement a two-person rule. Lock fellowship hall/ meeting rooms when not in use.

Lock the doors and windows to the house of worship when not occupied. The doors may be unlocked for a period of time before and after primary worship services, but are attended during services so that anyone entering the building after the start time will be recognized by ushers. Lock a cash room even when occupied and implement a two-person rule. Lock fellowship hall/ meeting rooms when not in use.

The doors and windows to the sanctuary may be unlocked for a period of time before and after primary worship services but are attended during services so that anyone entering the building after the start time will be recognized by ushers. Lock administrative areas when not occupied and also when only one or two people are onsite. Always lock a cash room even when occupied, and implement a two-person rule.

The doors and windows to the sanctuary may be unlocked for a period of time before and after primary worship services but are attended during services so that anyone entering the building after the start time will be recognized by ushers.

Maintain door and window locks. Continue to train ushers or the security team on access control.

Most card access control systems, electronic or mechanical pin pad locks are an upgrade to hardware store key cylinder locksets. Review all locksets and establish a plan to upgrade from key cylinder. Evaluate hinges windows and door frames for other weaknesses.

Review all locksets and establish a plan to upgrade from keyed cylinder. Evaluate hinges windows and door frames for other weaknesses.

Maintain the card access control system. Evaluate hinges windows and door frames for other weaknesses. Evaluate hinges windows and door frames for other weaknesses.

Change the hardware on both exterior and interior double doors so that it cannot be chained or tied together.

Evaluate interior double doors and where possible, modify or replace the hardware so that it cannot be chained or tied together.

Maintain door hardware. Evaluate other areas that may prevent access to first responders.

Establish a key control program. Ensure only certain members of the facility have keys and a master key is locked in a separate, access-controlled area. Track all duplicates and lost keys. When necessary, change the locks. Consider implementation of a card access system. If a card access system is implemented, task at least two trusted members of the facility with maintaining the card access database. When card access is revoked, make immediate changes to the database.

Establish a key control program. Ensure all duplicates are serial-numbered, recorded, and tracked. Lost keys should be recorded and tracked. When necessary, change the locks. If a card access system is implemented, task at least two trusted members of the facility with maintaining the card access database. When card access is revoked, make immediate changes to the database.

Minimize the use of keys, and maintain the key control program. Continue to improve the card access system. Ensure database changes are immediate.

Maintain the key control program. Update the card access database immediately upon termination of employees or volunteers.

Stay current with card access technology to prevent hacking of the system.

Publish and distribute guidance to avoid areas with glass features during an attack. Determine if it is practical to use wood or steel doors with smaller areas of glass. Replacing windows with smaller, nonoperational windows is an expensive option and may not be possible. If that is the case, close and lock windows at all times. If the house of worship requires windows to be open for ventilation, ensure everyone knows how to close and lock a window in an emergency. Other possibilities include installing heavy window coverings that can be lowered or slide on tracks and that can be positioned quickly or even remotely. This may provide some concealment from an attacker.

Publish and distribute guidance to avoid areas with glass features during an attack. Replacing windows with smaller, nonoperational windows is an expensive option and may not be possible. If that is the case, close and lock windows at all times. If the house of worship requires windows to be open for ventilation, ensure everyone knows how to close and lock a window in an emergency. Other possibilities include installing heavy window coverings that can be lowered or slide on tracks and that can be positioned quickly or even remotely. This may provide some concealment from an attacker. Ensure ushers or other volunteers know how to close and lock the windows.

Publish and distribute guidance to avoid areas with glass features during an attack.

Install an alarm system. This may be an internal system tied to a CCV system or a contract service that monitors, reports, and dispatches police as needed.

Install a complete alarm system to include glass breakage sensor. This may be an internal system tied to a CCV system or a contract service that monitors, reports, and dispatches police as needed.

Test and maintain the alarm system. Consider upgrades that tie into a CCV system.

Review the facility’s current configuration and determine the feasibility of shorter rows. Try to create aisles or paths that allow faster exit. Avoid using chairs that hook together or are affixed to the floor, if possible. Coordinate with local code management and fire departments for guidance.

Review the facility’s current configuration and determine the feasibility of shorter rows. Try to create aisles or paths that allow faster exit. Avoid using chairs that hook together or are affixed to the floor, if possible. Coordinate with local code management and fire departments for guidance.

Avoid using chairs that hook together or are affixed to the floor, if possible. Coordinate with local code management and fire departments for guidance.

Evaluate the possibility of creating more open space, flexible seating, or an open floor area with no seating. Coordinate with local code management and fire departments for guidance.

Coordinate with local code management and fire departments for guidance. Ensure exits are clearly marked and accessible.

Evaluate the feasibility of adding exit doors. Coordinate with building code and fire code enforcement personnel.

Coordinate with building and fire code enforcement personnel and determine if additional exits should be added or existing exits modified to improve the exit process.

Ensure all pathways and exits remain open and accessible. Possibly implement group rally or check points for accountability.

Explore the option of installing a camera system onsite. If this undertaking is feasible and appropriate for the house of worship, install cameras throughout the building to enable staff and possibly first responders to identify and assess threats.

Conduct a camera system survey to identify areas where coverage is lacking. Update the system to increase coverage.

Conduct a camera system survey to identify areas where coverage may be lacking. Ensure all entrances and sensitive areas have camera coverage.

Conduct a camera system survey to identify any areas where coverage may still be lacking.

Conduct a camera system survey to confirm camera coverage is sufficient.

Conduct a camera system survey to identify areas where cameras are ineffective. Based on the results of the survey, perform system updates.

Conduct a camera system survey to identify areas where cameras are ineffective. Based on the results of the survey, perform system updates.

Conduct a camera system survey to confirm the effectiveness of each camera in use. Confirm that area lighting is compatible with each camera.

Employ staff to monitor the camera system. If possible, provide a camera monitor in an administrative office visible to both staff and visitors and first responders.

Provide training to monitoring staff, and reduce or, if possible, eliminate their other duties.

Explore options to maximize the effectiveness of monitoring and observation, such as frequently rotating shifts for staff and limiting the number of cameras each staff member monitors.

Explore the feasibility of procuring a software program that aids in the determination of suspicious activity.

Explore the options of providing local law enforcement with the capability to access and monitor the camera system. Law enforcement personnel may easily view Internet protocol cameras remotely.

Install video recording and storage systems. Develop a policy for the review of recorded information (e.g., periodically or only after an incident). Recorded information can support investigations.

Increase the camera system’s storage capacity, preferably to a month.

Increase the camera system’s storage capacity to a minimum of 90 days.

Perform maintenance and system updates. Repair or replace any inoperable cameras, especially those in key locations. Explore options to provide backup power for the camera system.

Repair or replace any inoperable cameras. Ensure continuous updates are applied to the system, and test it routinely.

Evaluate the comprehensiveness of camera system tests. Testing should ensure the cameras work properly and should include an assessment of camera views. It may include switching the system to operate on backup power.