Malware Analysis Report
10337802.r1.v1
2021-07-08
Notification
This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.
This document is marked TLP:WHITE--Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.cisa.gov/tlp.
Summary
Description
This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). CISA processed three (3) files associated with a variant of DarkSide ransomware. NOTE: CISA has no evidence that this variant is related to the pipeline incident, referred to in Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks.
Ransomware is designed to encrypt the victim's files to extort and ransom for their recovery. DarkSide is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS)--the developers of the ransomware received a share of the proceeds from the cybercriminal actors who deploy it, known as "affiliates." This DarkSide ransomware variant executes a dynamic-link library (DLL) program used to delete Volume Shadow copies available on the system. The malware collects, encrypts, and send system information to the threat actor's command and control (C2) domains and generates a ransom note to the victim.
CISA is distributing this MAR, which includes suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques, to help network defenders identify and mitigate risks.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10337802-1.v1.WHITE.stix.
Click here for a PDF version of this report.
Submitted Files (3)
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 (156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d...)
3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a (045621d9.BMP)
f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e (README.045621d9.TXT)
Domains (2)
baroquetees.com
rumahsia.com
IPs (2)
176.103.62.217
99.83.154.118
Findings
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673
Tags
downloaderloaderransomwaretrojan
Details
Name |
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673.dll |
Size |
55810 bytes |
Type |
PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows |
MD5 |
f587adbd83ff3f4d2985453cd45c7ab1 |
SHA1 |
2715340f82426f840cf7e460f53a36fc3aad52aa |
SHA256 |
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 |
SHA512 |
37acf3c7a0b52421b4b33b14e5707497cfc52e57322ad9ffac87d0551220afc202d4c0987460d295077b9ee681fac2021bbfdebdc52c829b5f998ce7ac2d1efe |
ssdeep |
768:u2v9Ij6f3J8OT1PMK30DbQDH2doyomHRL83M4/NShWxEs0l29SFd2Xyj09rLd:fmET1PMK3qbpHY3M4wWmXgSFTSrLd |
Entropy |
6.789366 |
Antivirus
Ahnlab |
Ransomware/Win.DarkSide |
Antiy |
Trojan[Ransom]/Win32.DarkSide.gen |
Avira |
TR/AD.DarkSideRansom.muasl |
BitDefender |
Trojan.GenericKD.46189032 |
ClamAV |
Win.Packed.DarkSide-9262656-0 |
Comodo |
Malware |
Cyren |
W32/Trojan.HLZV-8042 |
ESET |
a variant of Win32/Filecoder.DarkSide.B trojan |
Emsisoft |
Trojan.GenericKD.46189032 (B) |
Ikarus |
Trojan-Ransom.DarkSide |
K7 |
Trojan ( 005795061 ) |
Lavasoft |
Trojan.GenericKD.46189032 |
McAfee |
GenericRXOX-NH!F587ADBD83FF |
NANOAV |
Trojan.Win32.Encoder.iuukal |
Quick Heal |
Trojanransom.Encoder |
Symantec |
Downloader |
Systweak |
trojan-ransom.darkside |
TACHYON |
Ransom/W32.DarkSide.55810 |
TrendMicro |
Ransom.17F5A898 |
TrendMicro House Call |
Ransom.17F5A898 |
VirusBlokAda |
BScope.TrojanRansom.Convagent |
Zillya! |
Trojan.Encoder.Win32.2315 |
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
PE Metadata
Compile Date |
2021-04-05 18:09:20-04:00 |
Import Hash |
6c8408bb5d7d5a5b75b9314f94e68763 |
PE Sections
MD5 |
Name |
Raw Size |
Entropy |
db99af79840cc24e4a2bc8920af97c4d |
header |
1024 |
1.699168 |
6738c20d4ea897835026864651841fca |
.text |
37376 |
6.090461 |
4e6ca671cfd10e3aa0e2dcd99bc287b6 |
.text1 |
1024 |
5.130274 |
c0265513cd36f1d659cc71bd70bfef58 |
.rdata |
512 |
3.215043 |
3853bbcd5344aff518bb2f1ccbd05bdd |
.data |
12288 |
7.713634 |
4d2b117a0087a34a0cb8575f34413c47 |
.ndata |
3584 |
7.935769 |
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Relationships
156335b95b... |
Connected_To |
baroquetees.com |
156335b95b... |
Connected_To |
rumahsia.com |
156335b95b... |
Dropped |
3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a |
156335b95b... |
Dropped |
f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e |
Description
This artifact is a 32-bit DLL that is a Darkside ransomware variant. The program is called ‘encryptor2.dll’. When it is executed, it will invoke the Volume Shadow service (vssvc.exe) to delete any Volume Shadow copies available on the system.
The malware collects information on the system to include the operating system, default language, username, hostname, domain, and operating system (OS) architecture. This information is encrypted and sent to one of the following command-and-control (C2) domains:
---Begin C2 Domains---
baroquetees[.]com
rumahsia[.]com
---End C2 Domains---
The malware reads the system GUID and uses the value to generate a unique eight character hexadecimal extension that it appends to the encrypted files. This extension is also used as the name of the running service the program uses to encrypt the user’s data.
---Begin Service Example---
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\.045621d9
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\.045621d9\DisplayName Data: “.045621d9”
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\.045621d9\ObjectName Data: “LocalSystem”
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\.045621d9\ImagePath Data: <Path to the DLL>
---End Service Example---
This variant of the malware contains a hard-coded key ‘_M8607761bf3212d6’ that it uses to decrypt an embedded base64 encoded configuration that runs the ransomware program. The program is configured to avoid encrypting any files located in directories that contain the following strings:
---Begin Avoided Directories---
$recycle.bin
config.msi
$windows.~bt
$windows.~ws
windows
appdata
application data
boot
google
mozilla
program files
program files (x86)
programdata
system volume information
tor browser
windows.old
intel
msocache
perflogs
x64dbg
public
all users
default
---End Avoided Directories---
Any files with the following extensions will not be encrypted:
---Begin File Extensions---
.386
.adv
.ani
.bat
.bin
.cab
.cmd
.com
.cpl
.cur
.deskthemepack
.diagcab
.diagcfg
.diagpkg
.dll
.drv
.exe
.hlp
.icl
.icns
.ico
.ics
.idx
.ldf
.lnk
.mod
.mpa
.msc
.msp
.msstyles
.msu
.nls
.nomedia
.ocx
.prf
.ps1
.rom
.rtp
.scr
.shs
.spl
.sys
.theme
.themepack
.wpx
.lock
.key
.hta
.msi
.pdb
.sql
---End File Extensions---
Before the encryption routine starts, the program will check to determine if any of the following processes are running, and shut them down:
---Begin Running Processes---
oracle
ocssd
dbsnmp
synctime
agntsvc
isqlplussvc
xfssvccon
mydesktopservice
ocautoupds
encsvc
firefox
tbirdconfig
mydesktopqos
ocomm
dbeng50
sqbcoreservice
excel
infopath
msaccess
mspub
onenote
outlook
powerpnt
steam
thebat
thunderbird
visio
winword
wordpad
notepad
---End Running Processes---
The following services will also be terminated:
---Begin Terminated Services---
.vss
.sql
svc$
memtas
mepocs
sophos
veeam
backup
GxVss
GxBlr
GxFWD
GxCVD
GxCIMgr
---End Terminated Services---
After the encryption routine runs, a bitmap image file is created in the path C:\ProgramData with the same name as the encryption extension, e.g. ‘045621d9.BMP’. The following registry keys are created that generate a ransom note wallpaper on the user’s desktop:
---Begin Wallpaper Registry Keys---
HKU\DEFAULT\ControlPanel\Desktop\Wallpaper Data: <Path to .BMP file>
HKCU\ControlPanel\Desktop\Wallpaper Data: <Path to .BMP file>
---End Wallpaper Registry Keys---
The .BMP file contains instructions to the victim for recovering data (Figure 1).
In each directory that the program has encrypted files, a ransom note is dropped with the naming format ‘README.<UniqueID>.TXT’. The file contains instructions for the victim to follow to recover files.
The following is an example of the recovery instructions:
---Begin Recovery Instructions---
----------- [ Welcome to DarkSide ] ------------->
What happend?
----------------------------------------------
Your computers and servers are encrypted, backups are deleted. We use strong encryption algorithms, so you cannot decrypt your data.
But you can restore everything by purchasing a special program from us - universal decryptor. This program will restore all your network.
Follow our instructions below and you will recover all your data.
What guarantees?
----------------------------------------------
We value our reputation. If we do not do our work and liabilities, nobody will pay us. This is not in our interests.
All our decryption software is perfectly tested and will decrypt your data. We will also provide support in case of problems.
We guarantee to decrypt one file for free. Go to the site and contact us.
How to get access on website?
----------------------------------------------
Using a TOR browser:
1) Download and install TOR browser from this site: hxxps[:]//torproject.org/
2) Open our website: hxxp[:]//dark24zz36xm4y2phwe7yvnkkkkhxionhfrwp67awpb3r3bdcneivoqd.onion/ZWQHXVE7MW9JXE5N1EGIP6IMEFAGC7LNN6WJCBVKJFKB5QXP6LUZV654ASG7977V
When you open our website, put the following data in the input form:
Key:
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
!!! DANGER !!!
DO NOT MODIFY or try to RECOVER any files yourself. We WILL NOT be able to RESTORE them.
!!! DANGER !!!
---End Recovery Instructions---
Screenshots
baroquetees.com
Tags
command-and-control
Ports
Whois
Domain Name: BAROQUETEES.COM
Registry Domain ID: 2536327775_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namecheap.com
Registrar URL: http://www.namecheap.com
Updated Date: 2021-02-27T09:49:39Z
Creation Date: 2020-06-11T14:12:08Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2021-06-11T14:12:08Z
Registrar: NameCheap, Inc.
Registrar IANA ID: 1068
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namecheap.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.6613102107
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Name Server: DNS1.REGISTRAR-SERVERS.COM
Name Server: DNS2.REGISTRAR-SERVERS.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
Domain name: baroquetees.com
Registry Domain ID: 2536327775_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namecheap.com
Registrar URL: http://www.namecheap.com
Updated Date: 0001-01-01T00:00:00.00Z
Creation Date: 2020-06-11T14:12:08.00Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2021-06-11T14:12:08.00Z
Registrar: NAMECHEAP INC
Registrar IANA ID: 1068
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namecheap.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.6613102107
Reseller: NAMECHEAP INC
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registrant Name: Withheld for Privacy Purposes
Registrant Organization: Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf
Registrant Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2
Registrant City: Reykjavik
Registrant State/Province: Capital Region
Registrant Postal Code: 101
Registrant Country: IS
Registrant Phone: +354.4212434
Registrant Email: b261116753cd4019a6d879fad2cd43ca.protect@withheldforprivacy.com
Admin Name: Withheld for Privacy Purposes
Admin Organization: Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf
Admin Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2
Admin City: Reykjavik
Admin State/Province: Capital Region
Admin Postal Code: 101
Admin Country: IS
Admin Phone: +354.4212434
Admin Email: b261116753cd4019a6d879fad2cd43ca.protect@withheldforprivacy.com
Tech Name: Withheld for Privacy Purposes
Tech Organization: Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf
Tech Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2
Tech City: Reykjavik
Tech State/Province: Capital Region
Tech Postal Code: 101
Tech Country: IS
Tech Phone: +354.4212434
Tech Email: b261116753cd4019a6d879fad2cd43ca.protect@withheldforprivacy.com
Name Server: dns1.registrar-servers.com
Name Server: dns2.registrar-servers.com
DNSSEC: unsigned
Relationships
baroquetees.com |
Resolved_To |
176.103.62.217 |
baroquetees.com |
Connected_From |
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 |
Description
The ransomware collects system information and sends it to this domain.
176.103.62.217
Tags
command-and-control
Relationships
176.103.62.217 |
Resolved_To |
baroquetees.com |
Description
At the time of analysis the domain baroquetees[.]com resolved to this Internet protocol (IP) address.
rumahsia.com
Tags
command-and-control
Whois
Domain Name: RUMAHSIA.COM
Registry Domain ID: 2519337945_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namecheap.com
Registrar URL: http://www.namecheap.com
Updated Date: 2021-04-28T07:21:46Z
Creation Date: 2020-04-27T16:07:26Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2022-04-27T16:07:26Z
Registrar: NameCheap, Inc.
Registrar IANA ID: 1068
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namecheap.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.6613102107
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Name Server: DNS101.REGISTRAR-SERVERS.COM
Name Server: DNS102.REGISTRAR-SERVERS.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
Domain name: rumahsia.com
Registry Domain ID: 2519337945_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namecheap.com
Registrar URL: http://www.namecheap.com
Updated Date: 0001-01-01T00:00:00.00Z
Creation Date: 2020-04-27T16:07:26.00Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2021-04-27T16:07:26.00Z
Registrar: NAMECHEAP INC
Registrar IANA ID: 1068
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namecheap.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.6613102107
Reseller: NAMECHEAP INC
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registrant Name: REACTIVATION PERIOD
Registrant Organization: Withheld for Privacy Purposes
Registrant Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2
Registrant City: Reykjavik
Registrant State/Province: Capital Region
Registrant Postal Code: 101
Registrant Country: IS
Registrant Phone: +354.4212434
Registrant Email: reactivation-pending@mail.withheldforprivacy.com
Admin Name: REACTIVATION PERIOD
Admin Organization: Withheld for Privacy Purposes
Admin Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2
Admin City: Reykjavik
Admin State/Province: Capital Region
Admin Postal Code: 101
Admin Country: IS
Admin Phone: +354.4212434
Admin Email: reactivation-pending@mail.withheldforprivacy.com
Tech Name: REACTIVATION PERIOD
Tech Organization: Withheld for Privacy Purposes
Tech Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2
Tech City: Reykjavik
Tech State/Province: Capital Region
Tech Postal Code: 101
Tech Country: IS
Tech Phone: +354.4212434
Tech Email: reactivation-pending@mail.withheldforprivacy.com
Name Server: dns101.registrar-servers.com
Name Server: dns102.registrar-servers.com
DNSSEC: unsigned
Relationships
rumahsia.com |
Resolved_To |
99.83.154.118 |
rumahsia.com |
Connected_From |
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 |
Description
The ransomware collects system information and sends it to this domain.
99.83.154.118
Tags
command-and-control
Relationships
99.83.154.118 |
Resolved_To |
rumahsia.com |
Description
At the time of analysis the domain rumahsia[.]com resolved to this IP address.
3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a
Tags
ransomware
Details
Name |
045621d9.BMP |
Size |
4339094 bytes |
Type |
PC bitmap, Windows 3.x format, 2308 x 940 x 16, image size 4339040, cbSize 4339094, bits offset 54 |
MD5 |
2e5dee7e7d8aa32b5a638cd619eb67b3 |
SHA1 |
1cbb4aa1dd284d62f4eb1833b6fe1290c122ccf7 |
SHA256 |
3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a |
SHA512 |
7f731e2fa892082a5f2c3e4865eaeab9b3f03ae26ce4fe545a46de5002130b1374b941fc3cb3bf0204d036b2233023658869bf22b626bf947627e03031b89276 |
ssdeep |
12:RLp5BJxhfVfPNpNhdhhxvn9RBxJRRPHJvPZBJxhf55vPpZ5B1ZJZxNBJv5B15Bpx:R |
Entropy |
0.155294 |
Path |
C:\ProgramData |
Antivirus
No matches found.
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
3ba456cafc... |
Dropped_By |
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 |
Description
This bitmap image is the wallpaper used by the ransomware.
f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e
Tags
ransomwaretrojan
Details
Name |
README.045621d9.TXT |
Size |
2009 bytes |
Type |
ASCII text, with very long lines, with CRLF line terminators |
MD5 |
135d0337c142e73417030daf30d835ac |
SHA1 |
4d03e3db39adaf57df53181429706aa854878026 |
SHA256 |
f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e |
SHA512 |
b07fefbceeba5eddac04ecf011f347fd3879b77330d4db6178dd1daa54dbed956f90e28ecf93404e8c98f9683aac0fd238133d6188f2926475204556fc6a1403 |
ssdeep |
48:L7EZWCOqZGgQx8N3NbS/3TXWAxdHyJWtbXi5RLNRVtRGHE:LAMCMxq3NbS/rrn9d2RL/VH7 |
Entropy |
5.517181 |
Antivirus
ESET |
Win32/Filecoder.DarkSide trojan |
TrendMicro |
Ransom.B01C9038 |
TrendMicro House Call |
Ransom.B01C9038 |
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
f6fba207c7... |
Dropped_By |
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 |
Description
This is the ransom note created by the Darkside ransomware variant. The note contains the .onion address and the preshared key to be sent to decrypt one file for free.
Screenshots
Relationship Summary
156335b95b... |
Connected_To |
baroquetees.com |
156335b95b... |
Connected_To |
rumahsia.com |
156335b95b... |
Dropped |
3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a |
156335b95b... |
Dropped |
f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e |
baroquetees.com |
Resolved_To |
176.103.62.217 |
baroquetees.com |
Connected_From |
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 |
176.103.62.217 |
Resolved_To |
baroquetees.com |
rumahsia.com |
Resolved_To |
99.83.154.118 |
rumahsia.com |
Connected_From |
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 |
99.83.154.118 |
Resolved_To |
rumahsia.com |
3ba456cafc... |
Dropped_By |
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 |
f6fba207c7... |
Dropped_By |
156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 |
Recommendations
CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
- Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
- Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
- Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
- Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
- Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
- Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
- Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
- Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
- Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
- Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
- Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
- Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
- Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, "Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops".
Contact Information
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Document FAQ
What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.
Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at www.cisa.gov.
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