Notification
This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.
This document is marked TLP:WHITE--Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.cisa.gov/tlp.
Summary
Description
This CISA submission included one unique file. This file is a malicious loader that contains an embedded executable. This embedded executable is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) that provides a vast array of Command and Control (C2) capabilities. These C2 capabilities include the ability to remotely monitor a system's desktop, gain reverse shell access, exfiltrate data, and upload and execute additional payloads. The malware can also function as a proxy, allowing a remote operator to pivot to other systems.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10382254-1.v1.stix
Submitted Files (2)
6589a687e69a182e075f11805a755ac1fabbddae1636c6fea8e80e7414521349 (hmsvc.exe)
6e3840f11aa02f391edd7e3e65b214f1af128fa207b4feb7f69e438014a2206d (658_dump_64.exe)
IPs (1)
192.95.20.8
Findings
6589a687e69a182e075f11805a755ac1fabbddae1636c6fea8e80e7414521349
Tags
trojan
Details
Name |
hmsvc.exe |
Size |
720384 bytes |
Type |
PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows |
MD5 |
df81145680b4deab198d9bba091d86e9 |
SHA1 |
4235d9a934d26ec688c21e3fc2e470178b7b3c21 |
SHA256 |
6589a687e69a182e075f11805a755ac1fabbddae1636c6fea8e80e7414521349 |
SHA512 |
de5e8164f58120e624e0546518b5c0c5df864baa9b389162f1be75547e6f684ee94f9df5738cdcf5065dd7bfcd6481c6ea45f4c1ff154edb4e0ad48ea5260d42 |
ssdeep |
12288:g5eggD3QpKCvO5yPPGtjLFanfI2YAMinlQZUub+RdYhawaGFbhwydP76N5:ceHD3eKU+tVafVgKlQZUlRdYVdP76N5 |
Entropy |
7.623341 |
Antivirus
Adaware |
Gen:Variant.Ulise.345018 |
AhnLab |
Trojan/Win.Generic |
Avira |
HEUR/AGEN.1248665 |
Bitdefender |
Gen:Variant.Ulise.345018 |
ESET |
a variant of Win64/Injector.HA.gen trojan |
Emsisoft |
Gen:Variant.Ulise.345018 (B) |
IKARUS |
Trojan.Win64.Injector |
YARA Rules
- rule CISA_10382580_03 : loader
{
meta:
Author = "CISA Code & Media Analysis"
Incident = "10382580"
Date = "2022-05-02"
Last_Modified = "20220602_1200"
Actor = "n/a"
Category = "Loader"
Family = "n/a"
Description = "Detects loader samples"
MD5_1 = "3764a0f1762a294f662f3bf86bac776f"
SHA256_1 = "f7f7b059b6a7dbd75b30b685b148025a0d4ceceab405e553ca28cacdeae43fab"
MD5_2 = "21fa1a043460c14709ef425ce24da4fd"
SHA256_2 = "66966ceae7e3a8aace6c27183067d861f9d7267aed30473a95168c3fe19f2c16"
MD5_3 = "e9c2b8bd1583baf3493824bf7b3ec51e"
SHA256_3 = "7ea294d30903c0ab690bc02b64b20af0cfe66a168d4622e55dee4d6233783751"
MD5_4 = "de0d57bdc10fee1e1e16e225788bb8de"
SHA256_4 = "33b89b8915aaa59a3c9db23343e8c249b2db260b9b10e88593b6ff2fb5f71d2b"
MD5_5 = "9b071311ecd1a72bfd715e34dbd1bd77"
SHA256_5 = "3c2c835042a05f8d974d9b35b994bcf8d5a0ce19128ebb362804c2d0f3eb42c0"
MD5_6 = "05d38bc82d362dd57190e3cb397f807d"
SHA256_6 = "4cd7efdb1a7ac8c4387c515a7b1925931beb212b95c4f9d8b716dbe18f54624f"
strings:
$s0 = { B8 01 00 00 00 48 6B C0 00 C6 44 04 20 A8 B8 01 }
$s1 = { 00 00 48 6B C0 01 C6 44 04 20 9A B8 01 00 00 }
$s2 = { 48 6B C0 02 C6 44 04 20 93 B8 01 00 00 00 48 }
$s3 = { C0 03 C6 44 04 20 9B B8 01 00 00 00 48 6B C0 }
condition:
all of them
}
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
PE Metadata
Compile Date |
2016-06-12 12:53:34-04:00 |
Import Hash |
4f2b9ad89041fedc43298c09c8e7b948 |
Company Name |
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com |
File Description |
Lists logon session information |
Internal Name |
LogonSessions |
Legal Copyright |
Copyright (C) 2004-2016 Mark Russinovich |
Original Filename |
logonsessions.exe |
Product Name |
Sysinternals LogonSessions |
Product Version |
1.4 |
PE Sections
MD5 |
Name |
Raw Size |
Entropy |
e16f93c6b1a062a1dc2156fc770594a6 |
header |
1024 |
2.888609 |
c4466c75f41681629fc2ead156f8de84 |
.text |
89088 |
6.366960 |
4d9a0bcd9467b5aaee5d4d762219821b |
.rdata |
65536 |
4.425938 |
f80417eeab656641c6a5206454b398d3 |
.data |
6656 |
3.054858 |
e0d2510e666231c532ff97edf51abd10 |
.pdata |
5120 |
4.855993 |
fff7f8f7be38486e0a6d01bc0472a6f2 |
.rsrc |
550912 |
7.914631 |
bca539afcd691a4a238b78fc830dc55a |
.reloc |
2048 |
4.939573 |
Relationships
6589a687e6... |
Connected_To |
192.95.20.8 |
Description
This malware is a 64-bit Windows loader that contains an encrypted malicious executable. During runtime, this encrypted executable is decrypted and loaded into memory, never touching the system's hard disk. The encrypted executable is similar in functionality to the file "f7_dump_64.exe" (88a5e4b24747648a4e3f0a2d5282b51683260f9208b06788fc858c44559da1e8), described in report MAR-10382580.
6e3840f11aa02f391edd7e3e65b214f1af128fa207b4feb7f69e438014a2206d
Tags
remote-access-trojantrojan
Details
Name |
658_dump_64.exe |
Size |
491520 bytes |
Type |
PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows |
MD5 |
f9e6ca0bdaa43df9ed0449b964e1b8b4 |
SHA1 |
24b983856dfdd4e48eeeafc9372b70d6b53ae722 |
SHA256 |
6e3840f11aa02f391edd7e3e65b214f1af128fa207b4feb7f69e438014a2206d |
SHA512 |
5b8bfe6f043cd6e0ee6ac6665e95751c5369ec171050497122533302f2d7f5f5b7a4a23c70618f396bd52b4ec919ff2214cc2641a0e46607707d3d393fd105eb |
ssdeep |
6144:F4ph6Duxm/k+DesM/uZwZLmixJwxbgaEvUhN8/bSJ40+R833OutenWRaMt:F4b6DV/k+D3MWZFXgJvBX/b0 |
Entropy |
6.058119 |
Antivirus
AhnLab |
Trojan/Win.PWS |
ESET |
a variant of Win64/Spy.Agent.EA trojan |
YARA Rules
- rule CISA_10382580_01 : rat
{
meta:
Author = "CISA Code & Media Analysis"
Incident = "10382580"
Date = "2022-05-25"
Last_Modified = "20220602_1200"
Actor = "n/a"
Category = "Remote Access Tool"
Family = "n/a"
Description = "Detects Remote Access Tool samples"
MD5_1 = "199a32712998c6d736a05b2dbd24a761"
SHA256_1 = "88a5e4b24747648a4e3f0a2d5282b51683260f9208b06788fc858c44559da1e8"
strings:
$s0 = { 0F B6 40 0F 6B C8 47 41 0F B6 40 0B 02 D1 6B C8 }
$s1 = { 35 41 0F B6 00 41 88 58 01 41 88 78 02 41 88 70 }
$s2 = { 66 83 F8 1E }
$s3 = { 66 83 F8 52 }
condition:
all of them
}
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
PE Metadata
Compile Date |
2022-02-21 19:02:06-05:00 |
Import Hash |
cc2269b4f6a11e02b40a384e27ad5e8c |
PE Sections
MD5 |
Name |
Raw Size |
Entropy |
60df3f67c31781bbec2444de6daf8a2b |
header |
4096 |
0.893865 |
9ebe1be469e63ff47601b0c714285509 |
.text |
327680 |
6.393378 |
1cb5bcc8bcade2b3ddee4dc6c617824a |
.rdata |
110592 |
4.552154 |
e89305f8c6e571d82fb370f352192aa2 |
.data |
20480 |
3.781076 |
ca8c03d7af637fa213b44d065c073c75 |
.pdata |
20480 |
5.309842 |
bab9a0fee3d912c3b866d3ca88b47510 |
_RDATA |
4096 |
0.256806 |
9a68c3f572ae2b201926c193eeed1cab |
.reloc |
4096 |
4.894447 |
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL) |
Description
This file is a 64-bit Windows executable that was extracted from the malware named hmsvc.exe, also included within this submission. Static analysis of this application reveals it is a RAT that provides a vast array of C2 capabilities to a remote operator, including the ability to log keystrokes, upload and execute additional payloads, function as a proxy, and have graphical user interface (GUI) access over a target Windows system's desktop. During runtime, the malware connects out to its hard coded C2 server 192[.]95[.]20[.]8 on port 443. After establishing this connection, the malware sits and waits for data to be sent back to it from the remote C2 server. Static analysis indicates the malware will receive a block of data that contains command data, and a 16-byte key. The 16-byte key will be extracted from this received data, and utilized to decrypt the command portion. The decrypted command portion of the C2 data will be checked to ensure that its first four bytes are equal to the value 0x0E03882Ah. If the values match, the malware will attempt to process the received decrypted data as a command. If the values do not match, the C2 session will be terminated and the malware will attempt to reinitiate a connection to the C2 server.
The executable is very similar in design and functionality to the file "f7_dump_64.exe" (88a5e4b24747648a4e3f0a2d5282b51683260f9208b06788fc858c44559da1e8), described in report MAR-10382580.
Screenshots
Figure 1 - This screenshot illustrates the cryptographic algorithm the malware utilizes to secure its inbound and outbound communications with its hard-coded C2. Communications between this malware and its C2, if collected, may be decrypted by following this algorithm.
Figure 2 - This screenshot illustrates the code structure the malware utilizes to decrypt inbound data from the remote C2, and then compare its first four bytes to the value 0x0E03882Ah. The inbound data must contain this value as its first four bytes, after decryption, in order for the C2 session to continue. The 16-byte key will be included in the inbound payload from the remote C2.
Figure 3 - The screenshot illustrates the malware's hard-coded C2 server, 192[.]95[.]20[.]8.
192.95.20.8
Tags
command-and-control
Ports
Whois
Queried whois.ovh.com with "ip-192-95-20.net"...
Domain Name: ip-192-95-20.net
Registry Domain ID: 1765585340_DOMAIN_NET-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.ovh.com
Registrar URL: https://www.ovh.com
Updated Date: 2021-12-01T02:56:46.0Z
Creation Date: 2012-12-11T13:59:05.0Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2022-12-11T13:59:05.0Z
Registrar: OVH, SAS
Registrar IANA ID: 433
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@ovh.net
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +33.972101007
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Organization: Hebergement OVH Inc.
Registrant Street: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant City: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant State/Province:
Registrant Postal Code: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Country: CA
Registrant Phone: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Phone Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Fax: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Fax Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Send message to contact by visiting https://www.ovhcloud.com/en/lp/request-ovhcloud-registered-domain/
Registrant Email: 45oplxny9ljiuizg7k3l@w.o-w-o.info
Registry Admin ID:
Admin Name: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Organization: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Street: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin City: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin State/Province: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Postal Code: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Country: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Phone: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Phone Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Fax: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Fax Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Send message to contact by visiting https://www.ovhcloud.com/en/lp/request-ovhcloud-registered-domain/
Admin Email: t0xyeloj2uxkh9uyhhjh@y.o-w-o.info
Registry Tech ID:
Tech Name: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Organization: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Street: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech City: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech State/Province: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Postal Code: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Country: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Phone: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Phone Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Fax: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Fax Ext: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Send message to contact by visiting https://www.ovhcloud.com/en/lp/request-ovhcloud-registered-domain/
Tech Email: t0xyeloj2uxkh9uyhhjh@y.o-w-o.info
Name Server: dns10.ovh.ca
Name Server: ns10.ovh.ca
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System:
http://wdprs.internic.net/
Relationships
192.95.20.8 |
Connected_From |
6589a687e69a182e075f11805a755ac1fabbddae1636c6fea8e80e7414521349 |
Description
The malware attempts to connect to this Internet Protocol (IP) address.
Relationship Summary
6589a687e6... |
Connected_To |
192.95.20.8 |
192.95.20.8 |
Connected_From |
6589a687e69a182e075f11805a755ac1fabbddae1636c6fea8e80e7414521349 |
Recommendations
CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
- Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
- Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
- Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
- Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
- Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
- Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
- Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
- Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
- Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
- Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
- Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
- Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
- Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, "Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops".
Contact Information
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/
Document FAQ
What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Central.
Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at www.cisa.gov.
|