CHEMICAL SECURITY SEMINARS

July 11, 2024

The Impacts of Artificial Intelligence on Chemical Security

Dr. Sean Ekins

Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Moderator: Dr. Erika McClure

Policy, Rulemaking, and Engagement Branch, CISA Chemical Security

#ChemicalSecurity

The Dark Side of AI: Dual Use of AI-powered Drug Discovery

Sean Ekins, CEO

Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

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Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Founded in 2015 - Pre-clinical stage company

Develops software for drug discovery and consumer product applications

>20 grants funded (~$21.2M) since 2016

Private company

3 Labs ~2,000 sqft incubator space at NC State University,

2,700 sqft office space

9 orphan drug designations for rare & neglected diseases

3 pediatric rare disease designations

1 patent issued, multiple patents filed, 7 trademarks

>150 publications



Our work has been highlighted by:

The Economist

FINANCIAL TIMES

The Washington Post

SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN

WIRED

NETFLIX

CNN

COLLABORATIONS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.

Company overview

- **We are a molecule discovery company**
  - We use *artificial intelligence* to develop molecules for consumer product and therapeutic needs. e.g. molecule design, sustainable chemistry, toxicology applications
- **We are a software company**
  - We license our internally-developed suite of machine learning tools allowing for the generative design and evaluation of molecules and the building/validation of brand new models.
- **We are a contract services organization**
  - Using our machine learning tools, we bring our AI expertise to your enterprise. We do the work, you keep the results.



Software tools

Our suite of machine learning and generative design tools is available for your molecule design needs

MEGASYN

A platform for generative design of molecules to create new intellectual property

ASSAY CENTRAL

A suite to curate structure activity data, then build and validate machine learning models

MEGAPREDICT

Thousands of machine learning models to help prioritize new uses and off target effects of molecules

MEGATOX

A suite of ADME and toxicology machine learning models with optional read across module

MEGATRANS

Human uptake and efflux transporter machine learning models

eCLEAN



Molecule preparation, autocuration and data visualization tools

MEGA AChE



Acetylcholinesterase machine learning models for multiple species

MACROLACTONEDb

A comprehensive database of macrolactones and associated biological data

UV ADVISOR

Prediction of the UV-VIS spectra for a molecule from structure alone

Finding new molecules or repurposing using machine learning









Urbina, Puhl, Ekins et al., 2021 Curr Opin Chem Biol, 65:74-84

COLLABORATIONS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.

Generative AI

Traditional AI

- Learns from data, makes decisions based on that data
- Decisions made within specific set of rules
- Doesn't create anything new
- Pattern recognition
- Alexa, Siri, etc.

Generative AI

- Learns from data, makes decisions based on that data
- Decisions can be made beyond the training data
- Creates new data
- Pattern / image creation
- ChatGPT

What This Means

- Generative AI will be used in almost every industry
- Companies need to take advantage of this technology to stay competitive.
- Drug discovery has used generative AI for molecule design
- Other industries could also use generative AI for molecule design with ideal properties

MegaSyn- Generative AI

- Integrated ML models for targets and off-targets
- Property prediction
- An easy-to-use interface
- Also command line version
- Enables rapid molecule generation
- Starting point for run could be a target molecule or guided by optimal parameter scores





Urbina et al., ACS Omega 2022 May 27;7(22):18699-18713

MegaSyn - Overview

Target Optimization Training

Outer Loop

Maximize Above-Threshold Fraction



Increase Penalty Thresholds

Inner Loop

MegaSyn

Train

Generate

Top-Scoring SMILES

SMILES/Molecules

CNC(=O)CCNCCc1c[nH]c2ccc(F)cc12
N#CCCNCCc1c[nH]c2ccc(F)cc12
C#CCCNCCc1c[nH]c2ccc(F)cc12
...

Rank

Predict

Scores

5-HT2a

5-HT2b

5-HT2c

Scalarizing Function

Scoring Models

Ibogaine, a potent drug for neuroplasticity

- Cameron, Tombari, Lu et. al. proposed, synthesized, and tested new ibogaine analogs with the following properties in mind:
  - Does not inhibit the hERG channel (avoid this cardiotoxicity)
  - Maintains specificity to 5-HT_{2A} (for efficacy)
  - Does not induce psychedelic experience (a toxicity)
- **tabernanthalog** meets these requirements



Ibogaine

Cameron, L.P., Tombari, R.J., Lu, J. *et al.* A non-hallucinogenic psychedelic analogue with therapeutic potential. *Nature* 589, 474–479 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-3008-z



tabernanthalog

- Can we propose tabernanthalog computationally?
- Challenges:
  - Natural product derivative
  - Multiple activity models / multiple parameter optimization

MegaSyn can generate tabernanthalog

- RNN trained on ChEMBL
- Hill-climb MLE:
  - Tanimoto Similarity to natural products library (CANVASS)
  - Activity model 5-HT_{2A}
  - In-activity models: hERG receptor, 5-HT_{1A}, 5-HT_{1F}, 5-HT_{2C}
  - Similarity: Ibogaine (Tanimoto > 0.6)
  - Lower logP than Ibogaine
- Generated 100,000 compounds
- Took the top 50 by model activity and parameters score

The top 50 contains Tabernanthalog…

Compound	MPO score	hERG activity?	2-5HT2A specific?
Ibogaine	3.8	1	1
Tabernanthalog	5.2	0	1
Gen 1	5.4	0	1
Gen 2	5.6	0	1
Gen 3	5.2	0	1
Gen 4	4.8	0	1
Gen 5	5	0	1
Gen 6	5.1	0	1
Gen 7	4.7	0	1
Gen 8	4.8	0	1
Gen 9	4.9	0	1
Gen 10	4.9	0	1



Urbina et al., ACS Omega 2022 May 27;7(22):18699-18713

Case Study: Ibogaine analogs



Urbina et al., ACS Omega, 2022









2021 An invitation…

Spiez CONVERGENCE

The kick-off: E-mail

Aug 27, 2021

Fabio

Coming soon in Sept 12-15 is a virtual closed conf I have a talk at..

I need some examples please to show how the technology can be "misused" - totally open to ideas because its all virtual..

I wonder if we could pick a particularly 'bad compound' say VX and use the generative approach to show how quickly compounds could be designed (we have models for toxicity and Acetylcholinesterase inhibition etc) that are toxic and scored for synthesizability..

Additional text redacted

cheers

Sean

Why did I pick VX?

- Ongoing project funded by DTRA

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

BATTELLE

- **Objective:** To develop *in vitro* and *in silico* human metabolism models for organophosphate (OP) pesticides and chemical warfare nerve agents (CWNA).



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De novo design of chemical threats using a generative AI

Therapeutic Molecule Design:
Acetylcholinesterase Inhibition: 1
LD_{50} Oral Toxicity: 0

Toxic Warfare agent Molecule Design:
Acetylcholinesterase Inhibition: 1
LD_{50} Oral Toxicity: 1





40,000 molecules in 6h

These molecules are all known precursors or chemical weapons

Urbina, Lentzos, Invernizzi, Ekins, J Chem Inf Model. 2023 Feb 13;63(3):691-694

Generative software can design toxic molecules

Generative Model features for scoring:

- Rat LD_{50} log(mg/kg) – a measure of lethality
- AChE EC_{50} – acetylcholinesterase – a target for nerve agents
- QED score – a measure of drug-likeness
- Similarity to VX



6h – created 40,000 virtual molecules
In the Top 5,000 scoring compounds were known VX analogs and other agents + new molecules with increased lethality (LD_{50}) and AChE inhibition



VX (LD_{50} 0.022mg/kg in mice)





Urbina, Lentzos, Invernizzi, Ekins, Nature Machine Intelligence 2022
https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-022-00465-9

Open and Commercial software and data collide

- **Data/ ML models** – **AChE** Target CHEMBL220, **Rat LD_{50}** (CATMoS) dataset (Environ Health Perspect. 2021 Apr;129(4):47013)
- **Software** – Many open-source generative tool kits (e.g. REINVENT - developed by AstraZeneca – on Github)
- Many other open-source cheminformatics tools (Rdkit, CDK etc), databases (PubChem etc.)
- **Retrosynthesis tools** - commercial : SYNTHIA (Millipore Sigma), open source AiZynthFinder (AstraZeneca) these would help decide how to make a molecule

Following the presentation, we started a collaborations with experts in the field

- Fabio Urbina, PhD.
  - Associate Director, Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
  - Software Development, machine learning, drug discovery
- Filippa Lentzos, PhD
  - Reader
  - Social scientist critically analysing biological threats, biosecurity and biorisk management
- Cédric Invernizzi, PhD
  - CBRN arms control expert
  - Concerned with developments in science and technology and their relevance to arms control
- Sean Ekins, PhD, DSc.
  - CEO, Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
  - Applications of machine learning for toxicology and drug discovery

Just the beginning?

- Comment published and went viral
- We have the technology to create massive numbers of synthetically reasonable molecules using generative approaches now – we make only a few!
- Unintended consequences of technology to design molecules as weapons
- How do we regulate /control / limit / monitor this “dual use potential” of software/data that is Open Source?
- Reputational risk to AI / Pharma industry
- We can erase the virtual molecules
- Need for more discussion at conferences – education
- This is the ongoing story behind it…



Check for updates

comment

Dual use of artificial-intelligence-powered drug discovery

An international security conference explored how artificial intelligence (AI) technologies for drug discovery could be misused for de novo design of biochemical weapons. A thought experiment evolved into a computational proof.

Fabio Urbina, Filippa Lentzos, Cédric Invernizzi and Sean Ekins

The Swiss Federal Institute for NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) Protection —Spiez Laboratory— convenes the ‘convergence’ conference series[1] set up by the Swiss government to identify developments in chemistry, biology and enabling technologies that may have implications for the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Meeting every two years, the conferences bring together an international group of scientific and disarmament experts to explore the current state of the art in the chemical and biological fields and their trajectories, to think through potential security implications and to consider how these implications can most effectively be managed internationally. The meeting convenes for three days of discussion on the possibilities of harm, should the intent be there, from cutting-edge chemical and biological technologies. Our drug discovery company received an invitation to contribute a presentation on how AI technologies for drug discovery could potentially be misused.

Risk of misuse

The thought had never previously struck us. We were vaguely aware of security concerns around work with pathogens or toxic chemicals, but that did not relate to us; we primarily operate in a virtual setting. Our work is rooted in building machine learning models for therapeutic and toxic targets to better assist in the design of new molecules for drug discovery. We have spent decades using computers and AI to improve human health—not to degrade it. We were naive in thinking about the potential misuse of our trade, as our aim had always been to avoid molecular features that could interfere with the many different classes of proteins essential to human life. Even our projects on Ebola and neurotoxins, which could have sparked thoughts about the potential negative implications of our machine learning models, had not set our alarm bells ringing.

Our company—Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Inc.—had recently published computational machine learning models for toxicity prediction in different areas, and, in developing our presentation to the Spiez meeting, we opted to explore how AI could be used to design toxic molecules. It was a thought exercise we had not considered before that ultimately evolved into a computational proof of concept for making biochemical weapons.

Generation of new toxic molecules

We had previously designed a commercial de novo molecule generator that we called MegaSyn[2], which is guided by machine learning model predictions of bioactivity for the purpose of finding new therapeutic inhibitors of targets for human diseases. This generative model normally penalizes predicted toxicity and rewards predicted target activity. We simply proposed to invert this logic by using the same approach to design molecules de novo, but now guiding the model to reward both toxicity and bioactivity instead. We trained the AI with molecules from a public database using a collection of primarily drug-like molecules (that are synthesizable and likely to be absorbed) and their bioactivities. We opted to score the designed molecules with an organism-specific lethal dose (LD_{50}) model[3] and a specific model using data from the same public database that would ordinarily be used to help derive compounds for the treatment of neurological diseases (details of the approach are withheld but were available during the review process). The underlying generative software is built on, and similar to, other open-source software that is readily available[3]. To narrow the universe of molecules, we chose to drive the generative model towards compounds such as the nerve agent VX, one of the most toxic chemical warfare agents developed during the twentieth century — a few salt-sized grains of VX (6–10 mg)[4] is sufficient to kill a person. Other nerve agents with the same mechanism such as the Novichoks have also been in the headlines recently and used in poisonings in the UK and elsewhere[5].

In less than 6 hours after starting on our in-house server, our model generated 40,000 molecules that scored within our desired threshold. In the process, the AI designed not only VX, but also many other known chemical warfare agents that we identified through visual confirmation with structures in public chemistry databases. Many new molecules were also designed that looked equally plausible. These new molecules were predicted to be more toxic, based on the predicted LD_{50} values, than publicly known chemical warfare agents (Fig. 1). This was unexpected because the datasets we used for training the AI did not include

Fig. 1 | A t-SNE plot visualization of the LD_{50} dataset and top 2,000 MegaSyn AI-generated and predicted toxic molecules illustrating VX. Many of the molecules generated are predicted to be more toxic in vivo in the animal model than VX (histogram at right shows cut-off for VX LD_{50}). The 2D chemical structure of VX is shown on the right.

Urbina, Lentzos, Invernizzi, Ekins, Nature Machine Intelligence (2022)

Professional interest

- **White House OSTP/NSC - March**
- Invited to participate in Rutgers seminar on ethics of mitigating global catastrophic biological risks - April
- Discussion with MIT CSAIL AI risk group - April
- Talk at Australia Group, Paris - June
- **Invitation to speak at OPCW-IUPAC workshop on AI applications in Chemistry, The Hague - June**
- Invitation to present to DTRA - Aug
- Talk at ACS meeting - Aug
- Talk to PNNL - Aug
- Spiez Convergence conference – Sept 2022
- Talk at AAPS meeting - Oct
- Multiple companies, institutes, US Gov orgs. reached out to discuss collaborations, business ideas
- 2003 - Presented in Brazil on behalf of the US State Dept 2023
- 2003 - Talk NIH CounterACT meeting, G7 group meeting,
- 2004 - various academics, authors etc..



Follow up articles by others

correspondence

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The perils of machine learning in designing new chemicals and materials

To the Editor — Machine learning is poised to revolutionize practice in chemistry and materials science. Already, machine learning is being used to find new pharmaceutical compounds, including in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. This holds great promise for the future, but also great peril. Right now, too little attention is being paid to the downside, as pointed out in a recent Comment by Urbina et al.[1].

It is easy to recognize the benefits of the machine-learning approach to, for example, testing chemicals and materials for toxicity — an area that we work on as a combined team of computer scientists

The scientific establishment has confronted dual-use problems similar to this before. When gene editing became possible, for example, leading scientists and ethicists called for a moratorium on clinical applications of germline gene editing, which involves inheritable alterations to the DNA of embryos to change the physical and mental capabilities of newborns. But a moratorium also means that we sacrifice some of the potential advantages that such advances might bring to society.

As machine-learning tools are made more broadly available for communities to use when making new compounds and



Sadasivan Shankar and Richard N. Zare
Nature Machine Intelligence, 2022, 4: 314

Check for updates

correspondence

No chemical killer AI (yet)

To the Editor — A Comment piece titled 'Dual use of artificial-intelligence-powered drug discovery' by Urbina et al.[1] that was recently published in this journal received considerable attention by several news outlets including The Economist, Der Spiegel and The Financial Times. A number of tabloid papers also ran pieces, with titles such as 'Killer AI invented 40,000 'lethal

for a chemical warfare agent. One of the publicly known agents that is structurally similar to VX but displays a higher toxicity (about 50%) is EA-3148 (Substance 100A) (Fig. 1). The United States and the Soviet Union both investigated this compound in detail under their Cold War chemical weapon programmes, but it was ultimately discarded for stockpiling[5,6]. Stability, physical



Marc-Michael Blum
Nature Machine Intelligence, 2022

Revisiting our work

Prior examples of dual use all required physically making it:

- **Synthesis of mousepox**
- **Synthesis of poliovirus**
- **1918 influenza virus**
- **Gain of function H5N1**
- **Synthesis of Horsepox**

A teachable moment for dual use (Nature Machine Intelligence)

2 additional papers

- Discuss recommendations for mitigation
- Putting it in context with scientist response before and after Manhattan Project

correspondence

A teachable moment for dual-use

To the Editor — Dual-use research of concern (DURC) can be defined as research, mainly in the life sciences, that has the potential to be misapplied for harmful purposes[1]. Key examples are the synthesis of mousepox[2], the synthesis of poliovirus[3], the generation of the 1918 influenza virus[4], gain-of-function studies with H5N1 in ferrets[5] and the synthesis of horsepox, the viral cousin of smallpox[6]. These seminal events involved the physical synthesis of a biological agent. However, the time may have come to also consider dual-use risk of the development of toxic agents in silico, in the light of the alarming results of a computational experiment we recently performed for a biennial arms control conference[7]: we used a generative artificial intelligence (AI) approach previously developed for drug discovery applications, and found it could easily design a range of nerve agents including VX. The experiment demonstrated the alarming speed and ease with which such software — based on open-source tools and datasets from the public domain — could be used for bad purposes. Our experiment was subsequently covered widely in the media, reaching a network of scientists, experts and lay people alike[8], and its implications were recognized at the highest levels of governments within a matter of days. The level of interest was probably amplified owing to the enfolding war in Ukraine, with Russia's invasion and the threat of biochemical weapons use.

Although we are a small team, the perspectives we provide are nationally diverse, span the private, academic and government sectors, and draw on expertise from the natural and social sciences as well as more technical fields such as computing and drug discovery. We believe our experiences from reporting and discussing our computational results so widely provided several important lessons that we wish to share with the scientific, ethics and security communities. First, the experiment is a powerful example of a concrete dual-use risk concern arising from converging technologies and this could be used to raise awareness of the security dimension of life sciences research. Second, our experience as a whole — obtained from reviewer and editorial feedback on our paper[7] to interactions with many groups after publication including with several interviewers — taught us the importance of increasing awareness in a responsible, non-alarmist way. Third, we need to consider what these dual-use findings mean for responsible science in drug discovery, and what action the community should be taking.

Responses to our article[7] have been varied widely. Some academics and government employees have requested the compound structures (this was denied); some suggested we should only use the technology for good (yes). Others asked whether the software could help to identify treatments for diseases of interest to them (yes, potentially). Some felt our thought experiment was obvious; whereas several experts on chemical weapons accepted that they had not considered it and saw novelty. Many were concerned about the security of the data generated. There have also been questions on why we published and whether the details of the experiment should have even been published at all — in line with responses to previous biological dual-use examples. In reply to this point, we believe that this new example highlights an important message, that dual-use risk potential in the life sciences goes beyond the synthesis of biological agents. For governments, our thought experiment highlights the challenge of how and when to limit access to generative and machine-learning software, including through export controls. For the drug-design community, it will now be necessary to agree on ways to share data and models securely.

Our thought experiment has already become a 'teachable moment for dual-use' — a positive unintended consequence of our study. It can be drawn on as a test case for considering the risks of research that involves converging technologies, in contrast to previous dual-use examples that focus on physical biological agents. It can also be used to provide dual-use risk training for those applying AI in drug discovery in the context of nerve agents and chemical weapons. Dual-use concerns in AI is already an urgent topic on the agenda for policymakers, but our results point to the need for further action in the development of regulation. Our pre-emptive publication may lead to increased diligence around AI technologies, datasets, models and related software for designing new molecules and the subsequent consideration of ethics and societal consequences[9]. Dual-use potential of AI is of concern to all scientists, not just those in the field of drug discovery. We hope that our thought experiment puts dual-use risk on the radar for a wider area without raising undue alarm and that it stimulates the search for potential solutions[9].

Fabio Urbina[1], Filippa Lentzos[2], Cédric Invernizzi[1] and Sean Ekins[1]✉

[1]Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Raleigh, NC, USA. [2]Department of War Studies and Department of Global Health & Social Medicine, King's College London, London, UK. [3]Spiez Laboratory, Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport's, Austrasse, Spiez, Switzerland.
✉e-mail: sean@collaborationspharma.com

Published online: 12 July 2022
https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00511-6

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3. Cello, J., Paul, A. V. & Wimmer, E. Science 297, 1016–1018 (2002).
4. Tumpey, T. M. et al. Science 310, 77–80 (2005).
5. Herfst, S. et al. Science 336, 1534–1541 (2012).
6. Noyce, R. S., Lederman, S. & Evans, D. H. PLoS ONE 13, e0188453 (2018).
7. Urbina, F., Lentzos, F., Invernizzi, C. & Ekins, S. Nat. Mach. Intell. 4, 189–191 (2022).
8. Editorial. Nat. Mach. Intell. 4, 311 (2022).
9. Shneiderman, B. & Ekins, S. Nat. Mach. Intell. 4, 304–305 (2022).

Acknowledgements
C.I. contributed to this article in his personal capacity. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors only and do not necessarily represent the position or opinion of the Spiez Laboratory or the Swiss Government. We acknowledge funding from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) grant number R44GM122196-02A1, the National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS) grant numbers 1R41ES030038-01 and 1R01ES030855-01, and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) for our machine-learning software development and applications. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the NIH.

Competing interests
F.U. and S.E. work for Collaborations Pharmaceuticals. F.L. and C.I. have no conflicts of interest.

Urbina, Lentzos, Invernizzi, Ekins, Nature Machine Intelligence volume 4, page 607 (2022)

What we did / did not design



Urbina et al., Drug Disc Today 2022

All compounds are captured by the schedules of the Chemical Weapons Convention as Schedule 2B04 (B. Precursors) [a]

Structure	Name	Use
	Phosphonic acid, methyl-, ethyl 1-methylethyl ester	A regulated substance [a].
	O-Ethyl methylphosphonothioic acid	A precursor for VX and VM. Also used in the synthesis of pesticides and drugs [a].
	Dimethyl methylphosphonate	A precursor used in the production of chemical warfare agents. Also a flame retardant [a].
	N,N-Dimethyl-p-methyl phosphonamidic acid, ethyl ester	A regulated substance [a].
	O-ethyl S-diisopropylaminomethyl methylphosphonothioate	A regulated substance [a].

Urbina, Lentzos, Invernizzi, Ekins, Drug Discov Today. 2023 Jan;28(1):103410

10 Recommendations for generative AI: Preventing AI from creating chemical threats

1. Learn from The Hague Ethical Guidelines
2. Engage numerous AI ethics institutes or other experts to provide guidance
3. Increase ethical training for computing students and raise awareness
4. Increase training of scientists in companies to recognize potential for dual use of generative AI
5. Keep a human in the loop
6. Waitlist restriction (e.g. like GPT-3 was initially) to limit access
7. Use a public facing API to control access and how models are used
8. Federated learning - use encrypted data to train model without decrypting data
9. Disclosure of potential for dual use in publications to encourage recognition of this potential and visibility
10. Regulation of software and applications in industry/academia: limit access to tools, knowledge and expertise

+ Self regulation, anyone?

Urbina, Lentzos, Invernizzi, Ekins, J Chem Inf Model. 2023 Feb 13;63(3):691-694

A small sample of global media interest

The Register

The Verge

Science – In the Pipeline

The Economist

Financial Times

Swiss National Broadcaster SRF

TA media

Radiolab (NPR)

Le Temps

Scientific American

C&ENews

National Geographic

Washington Post

Scientific American

Wired

Forbes

BBC

The Economist

AI and chemical warfare

Yikes!

Tweaking a piece of drug-design software creates chemical weapons instead

SCIENTIFIC PAPERS are normally models of discreet understatement. They are also (or are at least supposed to be) loaded with the information needed for others to replicate their findings.

Not this one. "Dual use of artificial-intelligence-powered drug discovery", just published in *Nature Machine Intelligence*, has clearly freaked its authors out. That comes over both in the tone of the text and the deliberate withholding of crucial information. For what Fabio Urbina and Sean Ekins of Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, in Raleigh, North Carolina, and their colleagues are reporting is a virtual machine that can be used to design new and nastier chemical weapons.

intelligence, AI, which the company has developed for the purpose of putting virtual molecules together and then assessing their potential as medicines), and turned one of its functions upside down. Instead of penalising probable toxicity, as makes sense if a molecule is to be used medically, the modified version of MegaSyn prized it.

The result was terrifying. Trained on the chemical structures of a set of drug-like molecules (defined as substances easily synthesised and likely to be absorbed by the body) taken from a publicly available database, together with those molecules' known toxicities, the modified software required a mere six hours to generate

Dual use of artificial-intelligence-powered drug discovery

Access & Citations

117k	25	45
Article Accesses	Web of Science	CrossRef

Online attention

- 7514 tweeters
- 148 news outlets
- 268 Mendeley
- 20 blogs
- 18 Redditors
- 9 Facebook pages
- 9 Wikipedia page

Podcasts



COLLABORATIONS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.

Ekins and Urbina in
Stakeholder perspectives on the Biological Weapons Convention

NETFLIX

Unknown: Killer Robots

2023 · TV-14 · 1h 8m

IMDb RATING
6.5/10
185



Documentary

Follows the terrifying behind-the-scenes of military-funded scientists racing to build this technology, as Artificial intelligence infiltrates every level of the armed forces.

Watch on Netflix
with subscription

2022 Another invitation…

Spiez CONVERGENCE

Large Language Models are the new frontier for misuse

- e.g. DALL-E from OpenAI
- AI models trained with **billions of data points**
- Interface queried with text
- e.g. can perform conversations, write articles, produce images, **invent,** etc.

- **An organization reached out on…request slightly changed for confidentiality**
- ***test model in area []? What risks are there ? How to measure the capabilities in area []?***
- ***What questions would we ask & and what risk is there?***
- ***Organizations are testing the vulnerabilities of AI***
- ***This may create additional unintended consequences***
- ***Weaponization of AI***

A new problem – Large language models

- How long before we can do the following with a language model online
- Input – “produce a new toxic molecule that would be easy to synthesize”
- The software cannot quite draw the exact structure of the molecule requested currently
- It would be difficult to prevent this form of misuse – the words used are innocuous
- What About ChatGPT etc

Using DALL E-2

a 3D render of a new molecule



a 3D render of a new toxic molecule that would be easy to synthesize



ChatGPT for Biology

"With RF Diffusion, the power of AI can be harnessed to create useful proteins in a

There's a 'ChatGPT' for biology. What could go wrong?

By Sean Ekins, Filippa Lentzos, Max Brackmann, Cédric Invernizzi | March 24, 2023



RF Diffusion now free and open source

March 30, 2023 | News Roundup

- AI language models for protein design are being developed rapidly. ProtGPT2, for example, has been trained on 45 million protein sequences, ProGen on 280 million sequences.
- A protein engineering AI could, say, re-design a protein structure around its active site, potentially removing any sequence similarity to the original molecule.
- Anyone working on toxin detection technologies—might find it difficult to identify new, unseen toxins.
- Established systems to detect and prevent the illegal export of toxins would not recognize them.



Animation by Erik English, edited under license from Alexdndz / Adobe.

Cloaking a protein function

- Take the active site of a protein (e.g. ricin) - remove surrounding structure and ask a generative AI to hallucinate and inpaint a new structure
- Sequence homology disappears = undetectable
- How would we detect it?
- *Structure of yeast hexokinase (PDB 1IG8) and an inpainted hallucinated model (backbone generation) was done with Rfdiffusion – holding the binding site constant*



Ekins, Brackmann, Invernizzi, Lentzos, GEN Biotechnology, 2023

Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Where does ChatGPT get us synthetically?

- It can get us so far – but its not able to predict molecules activities
- Not trained on the right data
- Even the synthesis information is too generic
- It may be able to generate molecules as ideas but there may be zero connection to target

- We can solve this by training on the relevant data
- Even public databases
- Synthesis information
- Publications etc.
- We can build LLMs on the data alone



Breaking ~~Bad~~ ChatGPT



Large Language Models to Translate Complex asks into API Endpoints

- ”I would like a set of 100 drug-like molecules which are likely to inhibit the drug-target Acetylcholinesterase.”
- “Does this molecule [CN1C=NC2=C1C(=O)N(C(=O)N2C)C] flag for any of the toxic endpoints in the liver?”
- “I would like to repurpose the drug aripiprazole, maybe to treat Alzheimer’s.”

LLM

API: MegaSyn
n=100
QED >= X
Input: IC50 AChE Model

API: MegaTox
Query: CN1C=NC2=C1C(=O)N(C(=O)N2C)C
input: models tagged: liver

A suite of ADME and toxicology machine learning models with optional read across module

API: AoPs, MegaPredict
MegaPredict Screen

Query:C1CC(=O)NC2=C1C=CC(=C2)OCCCCN3CCN(CC3)C4=C(C(=CC=C4)Cl)Cl
input: AoP Models for Alzheimer’s

LLM’s such as Toolformer: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2302.04761

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Global visibility for generative AI and challenges



AI is Dual Use – Solutions?

- Promote responsible AI R&D
- Develop and agree to ethical guidelines
- Design AI to limit malicious use
- Security
- Diligence when working with international partners
- Look for warning signs
- Respond to risks/ threats in own organizations
- Awareness and education
- Need for international cooperation and regulation

Summary

- Think about what AI tools you use today
- How might they be misused?
- All life sciences research and applications must be used responsibly
- The deliberate misuse of biological agents and toxins for harmful purposes is formally prohibited by international law, through the 1925 Geneva Protocol the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
- Train your students and staff

Acknowledgments

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Filippa Lentzos

Cédric Invernizzi

Maximillian Brockman

Spiez conference

All the scientists and journalists that have asked us questions

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R43GM122196
R44GM122196-02A1
1R41GM131433-01A1
3R44GM122196-03S1
2R44GM122196-04A1 — NIH National Institute of General Medical Sciences

1R43ES031038-01
3R43ES031038-01S1
1R43ES033855-01 — NIH National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, *Your Environment. Your Health.*

1R43DA055419-01 — NIH National Institute on Drug Abuse, *Advancing Addiction Science*

HDTRA1-19-1-0020 — DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

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Urbina, F., Lentzos, F., Invernizzi, C., Ekins, S. **Dual use of artificial-intelligence-powered drug discovery.** *Nat Mach Intell* **4**, 189–191 (2022).

Urbina, F., Lentzos, F., Invernizzi, C., Ekins, S. **A teachable moment for dual-use**. *Nat Mach Intell* **4**, 607 (2022).

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Urbina, F., Lentzos, F., Invernizzi, C., Ekins, S. **Preventing AI from Creating Biochemical Threats.** *J Chem Inf Model*, **63,** 691-694 (2023).

Ekins, S., Lentzos, F., Brackmann, M., Invernizzi, C. **There's a 'ChatGPT' for biology. *What could go wrong?*** *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (2023)

Ekins, S., Brackmann, M., Invernizzi, C., Lentzos, F., **Generative Artifical Intelligence-Assisted Protein Design Must Consider Repurposing Potential** *GEN Biotechnology* (2023)

Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

The Original article impact

nature machine intelligence

Comment | Published: 07 March 2022

Dual use of artificial-intelligence-powered drug discovery

Fabio Urbina, Filippa Lentzos, Cédric Invernizzi & Sean Ekins

Nature Machine Intelligence **4**, 189–191 (2022) | Cite this article

Dual use of artificial-intelligence-powered drug discovery

Access & Citations

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Article Accesses	Web of Science	CrossRef

Online attention

- 7016 tweeters
- 162 news outlets
- 314 Mendeley
- 22 blogs
- 18 Redditors
- 9 Facebook pages
- 15 Wikipedia page

This article is in the 99th percentile (ranked 85th) of the 452,839 tracked articles of a similar age in all journals and the 97th percentile (ranked 1st) of the 47 tracked articles of a similar age in *Nature Machine Intelligence*

Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Thank you!

Talk to us:

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sean@collaborationspharma.com