MAR-10334057-3.v1: Pulse Secure Connect
NotificationThis report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise. This document is marked TLP:WHITE--Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.cisa.gov/tlp. SummaryDescriptionCISA received one Common Gateway Interface (CGI) for analysis. The CGI script is a Pulse Secure file, maliciously modified to siphon login credentials to a file stored in the /tmp directory on the compromised Pulse Secure device. This analysis is derived from malicious files found on Pulse Connect Secure devices. For a downloadable copy of indicators of compromise, see: MAR-10334057-3.v1.stix. Submitted Files (1)b1d8fe6806fb8539a3d059ca5a3abfbf4797ca862fc28f67b5091db5c2edce51 (OrphanFile-58641) Findingsb1d8fe6806fb8539a3d059ca5a3abfbf4797ca862fc28f67b5091db5c2edce51Tagscredential-harvestertrojan Details
AntivirusNo matches found. YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. DescriptionThis CGI script is a Pulse Secure file, maliciously modified by the attacker to siphon login credentials to a file named "dswebserver.statementcounters", stored in the /tmp directory of the compromised Pulse Secure device. The malicious code starts from "my $uf=" and ends at "close (*FN);" (Figure 1 and 2). Screenshots
Figure 1 - Screenshot of the malicious code added by the attacker to store login credentials.
Figure 2 - Screenshot of the malicious code added by the attacker to store login credentials. RecommendationsCISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, "Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops". Contact Information
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/ Document FAQWhat is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Central. Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at www.cisa.gov. |
Revisions
Initial Version: August 24, 2021
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.